

JPRS 75922

23 June 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2138



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

23 June 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2138

CONTENTS

EGYPT

- Top-Level Symposium Discusses Nation's Relations
With Other Arabs
(AL-AHRAM, various dates) 1
- Government Spokesman Discusses New Cultural Organization
(Mustafa al-Damarani; AL-AHRAM, 26 Apr 80) 45

IRAN

- Kurds Learn To Stop Tehran's Tanks
(Giancesare Flesca; L'ESPRESSO, 25 May 80) 52

TOP-LEVEL SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSES NATION'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARABS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 Apr 80

/Article: "AL-AHRAM Raises the issue of the Day in a Broad Symposium: Egypt--and the New Arab Situation"/

/21 Apr 80 p 6/

/Text/ If today, for the first time in their history, the Egyptian people are discussing the future of relations with their Arab nation, after all they have long suffered and borne in terms of the positions and allegations made by rulers of the Arab rejection states--which strike each Egyptian with a deep wound in the heart, as they try to impugn Egypt's arabhood, the sacrifices of Egypt's people and everything the "Egyptian experiment" has achieved in the way of political, economic and social liberation for its Arab brothers--if all the Egyptian people are now today facing the pressing question:

"What must Egypt's position be in the face of these rejectionist Arab rulers?"

Then it is not acceptable or conceivable that alienation or estrangement be one of the options presented for discussion. That is what some people possessing perverse political intentions intend to repeat now: a belief on their part that Egypt seems eager to wash its hands for once and for all of its relations with the Arab nation, which says that it esteems Egypt.

However, when it is asserted that this sort of "alienation and estrangement" is an option to be rejected, those who adhere to the arguments rejected produce an automatic question to this conclusion, which they clothe in the garb of logic by saying:

Why then should the Arab dispute now be treated in a grave manner which places the Egyptian people in confrontation with their brethren the Arab peoples? Hasn't the history of Egyptian-Arab relations witnessed many crises and vicissitudes before, only to have concord restored, in a climate of warmth and purity? What is new in the relations today that has prompted mention of the issue on the popular level?

Regardless of their objectives, those who raise the question must be ignoring the main fact which stands before them, which is that those who have created the dispute with Egypt and have continued escalating it have transcended all the traditional forms of disputes with governments this time and have not shrunk from bluntly declaring their effort to make the Egyptian people go hungry. Therefore it is essential that the option for the future come from the Egyptian people. Moreover, the leaders in Egypt have proceeded in conformity with a style which is distinguished by a government based on consultation with the people on major issues, and there is no issue greater or more serious than the future of Egyptian-Arab relations.

The Working Paper presented to the people specifies a number of new phenomena which are manifesting the surface aspect of Arab disputes this time:

First, the rejectionist rulers in Arab countries have tried to shift the dispute from the Arab context to the Islamic one, then to the African one, then to the nonaligned one, and finally to the international one.

Second, these rulers' attempts have caused them to fall into the clutches of non-Arabs who have no objective but to weaken the Arab world as a whole in order to facilitate attempts to dominate it and use to serve goals remote from its true interests.

Third, the Arab position on the peace initiative has broadened the gap between the Arab peoples and the rejectionist leaders in the Arab world, since the Arab peoples believe in peace and welcome the Egyptian initiative.

Fourth, the attempt to isolate Egypt from the Arab world--or, more properly, to isolate the Arab world from Egypt--has resulted in the consequence that the Arab nation has become alienated from its natural center of leadership and has become faced with positions in which disputes and quarrels among its countries have become intensified, and dissension and instability within the countries have increased--indeed, have extended to the whole region.

Would that after all this they had raised one alternative to the use of force against Egypt! However, they satisfied themselves with imagining that it was possible to create a rift among brothers.

Since this will not happen--for "alienation and estrangement" is an option which is not at issue, indeed is rejected--the Working Paper has placed three options, which are not rigid, before every Egyptian so that he may draw from it, add to it or modify it: watching and waiting; the adaption of slogans; or a continuation of the initiative and appeal to the peoples.

In order to help arrive at a sound "popular option" which will define the form and substance of future relations between Egypt and the Arab world in the final third of the 20th century, AL-AHSAAM held a symposium for a

broad dialogue and discussion of the Working Paper President al-Sadat presented, and the facts and options it contains. Participating in the dialogue were people possessing knowledge, culture and a past rich in Arab activity. Perhaps the most important thing to which they drew attention was that they were contributing their ideas and opinions to deepening the broad popular dialogue which is going on in various areas of Egypt but that they did not imagine that they were presenting anything which could result in easily-reached options.

In AL-AHRAM's meeting with the parties to the dialogue, in the first part of its symposium on the future of Egyptian-Arab relations, it was deemed logical that AL-AHRAM should first take stock of the facts of the current Arab situation which required that Egypt today raise the form which future Arab relations might take in the broadest open discussion on the popular level.

AL-AHRAM: We are meeting in the context of the democracy of Egyptian life, which has opened the doors of freedom to every person holding an opinion, even a dissident opinion. While most, indeed all, Arab regimes are deprived of the activities of modern life which involve the exercise of a comprehensive democracy--while some are indeed experiencing a climate of oppression and terror, under the spear points of fear--this meeting, with an open dialogue, will in itself disseminate light, will open a free window whose winds we hope will blow over our brothers everywhere in the great Arab nation, offering them a vivid vision of its reality, with all that contains in the way of the combative and cultural self-sacrifice that is occurring on the terrain of life in Egypt.

Our meeting at this symposium is in reality aimed at something important: Arab existence and the dangers and setbacks encompassing it following the campaign of wilful ignorance which specific regimes have launched against Egypt--God's land of Egypt--in order to alienate Egypt's quest for exploration from the Arab movement, so that these regimes may infect this movement with dissension and alienation and may give themselves and the movements of political repression and foreign dominance free rein.

The fact we cannot ignore is that the Arab nation is now experiencing a severe test. Whether this test is the doing of these regimes or of others, Egypt's role will continue to be one of sacrifice for our Arab nation. We do not want to enter into a controversy on Egypt's Arab identity: this issue is not relevant in form or in substance, but is rather in the nature of things which are not dictated by conditions or circumstances. It is an enduring role, and therefore, through the paper on the Arab situation, we recommend that the agenda of the discussion in this dialogue be to discuss two points. First is, has Egypt fallen short or abandoned its Arab role? Why should we raise the true state of our relations with the Arab states before the people? What must the future of these relations be?

The second issue is the offshoot of the first one: What options which might constitute an effective, strong Egyptian stand vis-a-vis the rejectionist regimes?

In the context of the three options listed in the paper on the Arab situation, we can define the main signposts on the road, even if through a fourth option, or a fifth one, if you like.

A Model for Dominating Events

Dr Sayyid Nawfal: This document, in fact, represents a signpost along the road to common Arab action. On the one hand, in its general style, it is distinguished by setting a new example for dominating events instead of following them. This is the policy which Egypt followed during the seventies, in war and peace, in democracy and development. Next, it is also distinguished by objectivity and fairness in portraying Egyptian policy, which has had a coherent sequence from the royal era, to the first era of the revolution and to the second era of the revolution, or the corrective revolution, in spite of differences in style.

After Dr Sayyid Nawfal outlined his political view of the agenda on which the Arab Action Paper was based, he made some observations of the paper, in anticipation of an integrated view, considering that it was a document of particular importance in forming popular opinion aside from its historic significance. One aspect of these observations focused on the points under review, but the main aspect was aimed at a number of issues whose thorough treatment in a broader arena Dr Nawfal considered essential. Among these issues was an evaluation of joint action, with its accomplishments and failures, means for rectifying the failures, and the policy of Arab summits which the action paper referred to, while not explaining the causes of these summits' failures or accomplishments. Then there is the rejection movement whose subject we are dealing with now: what were its causes? Was it founded on legitimacy or on an aversion to Arab and international legitimacy and the commitments to which the Arab states had bound themselves?

These observations on the Action Paper stirred up numerous comments from parties to the dialogue which led to the conclusion that the Action Paper, as its name states, presents a concentrated comprehensive historic review through which we can arrive at the options presented but is not a comprehensive historic record of all the details of Egyptian-Arab relations throughout their lengthy history. That is something the researcher can find, as Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din said, in the president's speeches, which have given details on these relations in the form of dates, facts and names.

Everyone has supported Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din's statement that one felt, on every line of the paper, the extent of the pain and bitterness wrenching the president's heart as he recorded what Egypt has been offering in every area and the simultaneous contrasting record of repudiation and denial.

Dr Maurice Makramallah: There is no doubt that one of the things enriching the Action Paper is that these observations, which our teacher Dr Sayyid Nawfal has set out, are clear; however, they may not be the basic point of our discussion. Let us return to the first issue we were discussing,

which was the response to the question AL-AHRAM raised: Has Egypt fallen short, in our relations with the Arabs? If there have not been any shortcomings, why the current situation? Or perhaps Dr Nawfal was on the verge of beginning his analysis.

The Rejection Movement Is Illegitimate

Dr Nawfal: I believe we said, "thoroughly treat the issues which will show us precisely how the rejection movement is illegitimate and has violated Arab commitments, then, after that, we will evaluate Egyptian action in the Arab sphere and the Islamic context, according to the following principles which are dictated by national and regional responsibility and international conditions:"

First, devoting major attention to supporting domestic Egyptian forces, on grounds that they are the firm base for national construction and the performance of Arab action.

Second, continuing the advancing progress toward just comprehensive peace so that that may be imposed entirely and all rejectionist excuses may collapse.

Third, asserting the commitment to the provisions of joint Arab defense and the security obligations which defense dictates.

Fourth, welcoming the re-establishment of relations with any Arab country trying to correct its position, without condition or restriction.

Fifth, developing current Egyptian relations with Arab countries in various spheres--cultural, scientific, artistic, touristic and so on--and taking any opportunity offered for contact in the context of trade unions, parties or other groupings--indeed, in the official context, if it is possible to get to it.

Egyptian Media Fields

Sixth, objectively and positively examining and concentrating on the following issues in the Egyptian media field:

Describing inevitable Arab integration in the security, political, economic and social fields.

Bringing attention to corresponding dangers threatening Arab countries and the consequences the current dissension will entail.

Stating the primitive nature of the policy of severing relations and the damage that policy does in various domestic, Arab-wide and international areas!

Setting forth an Egyptian plan for essential new Arab action, which will be presented at the appropriate time, will be preceded by incisive publicity and will benefit from the experiences of the past as it defines duties and commitments and creates effective agencies to be on guard to settle disputes the moment they arise.

AL-AHRAM: These issues could serve as a formula for action which we might subsequently present for a general reading. The question which is still up for discussion is, has Egypt fallen short?

Egypt Has Not Fallen Short

Dr Maurice Makramallah: In my opinion, that is not at issue. Egypt has not fallen short, and, if it has fallen short in certain peripheral areas, it is of course well known that Egyptian manpower has been serving in these countries for years, has helped the education and development process and so on, and therefore, even though this contribution has been for pay, it has first and last been to these countries' benefit. Egypt has also borne responsibility in the scientific field, in the political field, in the military field.

Dr al-'Ashmawi: Egypt's cultural, social and religious role must be made clear to the masses who will discuss this paper, along with its pre-eminence over Arab countries. Therefore I say that if there have been shortcomings, they might have been more from the political angle than from others. There have never been shortcomings from the cultural angle. Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi is here with us, and she, and a large group along with her, have experienced this cultural sacrifice. They are the ones who have taught the Arabs; they are better known outside Egypt than inside it. This aspect must be made clear to all classes of the Egyptian people when we present this paper to them. The labor movement in Egypt was the pioneering movement in all Arab states, which had no previous experience with unions.

Egypt Is the Leader and Is Capable

Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi: The fact is that we cannot make Egypt's role more prominent than it really is. Egypt cannot have fulfilled its commitments or its role completely at every time, everywhere and on every occasion. The paper has been concerned with giving prominence to the main points, or the critical positions, as we say, in which Egypt has taken its stand and truly was a leader capable of rising to the level of events. In the detailed sense, there is no doubt that if we look into certain peripheral situations in Egypt's history and relations with the Arab countries throughout the ages we might find shortcomings. I can also state that what the paper says about Egypt's role might have concentrated on the recent period more than on the past, in view of the fact that we are standing before a recent history whose conclusions we hope we will soon be drawing conclusions from. The fact is that in Egypt's role, through its long history,

we celebrate a great deal which has not been included in the paper--such as things which happened in the days when Saudi Arabia had not yet discovered oil!

However, prior to the revolution, there were very many situations when we were not able to play our role, but we did not clearly know our Arab identity. 1956 was the first time it was stated in Egypt's constitution that Egypt was an Arab country.

In reality, I cannot say whether Egypt has done its duty or has fallen short because as far as I am concerned the mere question is irrelevant. It has absolutely not fallen short in the critical situations but there have been many shortcomings in peripheral ones, though in fact that is not a shortcoming--it is a circumstance of history.

Re-establishment of Relations--How?

It seems that the point which Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi concluded with prompted a pressing question from Dr Zakariya al-Barri; he would have postponed it until he was given the floor, but then he proceeded to ask it, directing it to Dr Sayyid Nawfal:

Dr Zakariya al-Barri: I just want to ask our professor Dr Sayyid Nawfal for clarification on the point in which he welcomed the re-establishment of relations with any country wishing to correct its position. In my mind there are two groups in the Arab world. Relations can be re-established with one group immediately, and there is one group with which I do not believe relations can be re-established with such facility and ease, even if that group so wishes, because repeated experience has made us believe that these countries entertain unusual objectives--as in what Libya, specifically, is doing, for example, or Syria, with its Alawite orientations. Every one of us can go back into the past and present history of the Alawites, and refer to the book by ibn Taymiyah and his writings about the Alawites and their role in the past, which they are repeating in exactly the same manner.

Would it be possible, if they told us "Come, let us re-establish relations," for us to re-establish them? A devout man cannot be pelted by the same stone twice. That is to say, we would be continuing with this farce until judgment day and would never be able to move properly. However, in other areas, which may include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the Gulf, we want to tell people, "No, in disputes over viewpoints, causes should not spoil affection; it is not right for us to end up with this estrangement."

A Decisive Stage of Relations

Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id: There is no doubt that there is no quarrel with the fact that Arab relations are going through a decisive period now. It is obligatory to study these relations with total objectivity in the desire that a number of bases may be set forth which will lead to the attainment of Arab objectives.

My opinion is that this paper sought to stress a group of fundamental principles and ideas.

It sought to stress, first that Egypt has constantly supported and stressed its Arab identity.

It also sought to stress that in spite of this positive, effective Egyptian role, there have constantly been groups which, for one reason or another, have tried to reduce Egypt's role and seize the opportunity to cast aspersions on it. The Ushturah Conference is one example which the paper tried to enumerate. Although such groups do exist, the paper sought to stress that Egypt paid no heed and continued to persevere, with faith in its Egyptian role and the need to support the Arab struggle, among all its other principles.

In addition, in my opinion, the paper sought to stress that this Arab role of Egypt's continued after the death of 'Abd-al-Nasir, and that since 1970, when President al-Sadat took power, the Arab path has been the basic path of Egypt's foreign policy.

In my opinion the paper has a basic philosophy behind this, and this is that it hopes new relations which will realize Arab nationalism and Arab solidarity will be established between Egypt and the Arab world, on sound foundations.

Consequently the question which arises now is, How can we in the future build these relations which will lead to the attainment of Arab goals on sound foundations?

It is mandatory that we first of all ascertain the true nature of the causes which lie behind the current Arab situation.

There are people who say that the issue lies in the nature of existing Arab regimes, especially the rejection states where the regimes are dictatorial by nature, impose specific slogans, adhere to them, lose the ability to discern true objective developments in Arab and international relations, and are unable to act and interreact with Egypt in objectively analyzing and objectively coping with the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Another cause which is raised goes back to the nature of the goals of foreign powers in the Arab region: in the current historical stage of the circumstances of the Arab world and the resources existing in it, these forces are unanimously trying to split up the Arab world, not to unite it, and these foreign forces cannot be ignored, either, in determining causes or drawing up relationships.

Then there is the issue of Arab leadership: there is no doubt that the wealth which has flowed out in the Arab world, in Saudi Arabia and in other countries, is one of the reasons behind the desire to assume leadership of the Arab world.

There are also people who raise the point that Egypt must understand the psychology of the Arab world in the current stage, since it is a world which is moving from the stage of being Egypt's child to that of being Egypt's brother. The saying "When your son grows up, become his brother," means that the state wants to find a specific role which it can play alongside Egypt's leading role. Has Egypt given this Arab world, or these states, the opportunity to play this role? This question also is relevant. It is reflected in the nature and reality of Arab-Egyptian relations.

/22 Apr 80 p 6/

In their treatment of the question AL-AHRAM raised in the first part of its symposium on "the future of Egyptian-Arab relations," which was, "Has Egypt at any time abandoned its Arab role," the parties to the discussion concluded that Egypt's Arab role is a historic fact, however much rejectionist arguments may have sought to denigrate it or cast doubts about it. Egypt's generosity toward its Arab nation has always represented a policy with continuous links, even before it established a special emphasis with the premises of the Egyptian revolution of 23 July 1952, and its pre-eminence in achieving political, economic, social and cultural liberation for the Arab countries. If Egypt's role in some peripheral matters which were not critical ones was somewhat regressive, before the revolution, that was due to historical circumstances and to the conditions which prevailed in Arab countries weighed down by occupation or fettered by the mandates. Egypt's Arab role following the revolution made up for all the regressive acts it could have been blamed for, which did not reach the extent of shortcomings. Then came al-Sadat's tenure, which has stressed and crystallized the basic political path 'Abd-al-Nasir began.

Egypt's Arab role ramified and extended to all areas of self-sacrifice, to the point where it was said that self-sacrifice was above Egypt's ability and capacity. In spite of that, people appear today who imagine that everything can be swallowed up in the abyss of repudiation and neglect, in the hope that Egypt will seek refuge from its Arab affiliation and will wash its hands of everything, abandoning the natural leadership position in which its distinguishing characteristics on the Arab stage have placed it to people in quest of perverse aims.

In confronting the rejectionist rulers, who, through their irresponsible positions, have created a new Arab situation, the Working Paper set out the options for the future in relations with the Arab rejection states. The second part of the symposium's discussion revolved around this.

The second part of the symposium began with an observation which AL-AHRAM considered it necessary to make before opening the discussion regarding the options at hand on the form of future Arab relations.

AL AHRAM: We must go over the rejectionist newspapers tomorrow or the day after and review what they are likely to say after this symposium gets into

print. We will find people who say, in malicious wonderment, "Who said we ignored the role of the Egyptian people? We are not against the people, we are just against the leaders" The fact is that this is a gross mistake, because an attack on the Egyptian people is indeed a jolt to its leadership of the Arab world. The greatest example of that is the revisionist process which has unfortunately occurred in the whole Arab world concerning Dr Taha Husayn, Imam Muhammad 'Abduh and the prince of poets, Shawqi. They have cast doubts on the literary merit of Taha Husayn, who is the dean of Arab letters.

It is important that most of those who are in charge of the regimes in power in the Arab countries now were--most or some of them--graduates of Dr Taha Husayn's. The same is true of those professors who are engaged in religious jurisprudence of Islamic law in some Islamic countries and learned from the books, theories and thinking of Imam Muhammad 'Abduh. However, they have ignored that and are now attacking the Egyptian people, its leaders and its people, not just the leaders alone.

The Question: Will We Wait?

Therefore, at the start of the second session of the symposium, we will raise the first option on the form of future relations between Egypt and the Arab rejection states: will we wait, as happened in the past, until there is a flash of Arab capriciousness, as they have been saying, after which matters will resume their course? Some people say no; the Working Paper says no. President al-Sadat himself, in one of his statements--the gist of which appeared in the Arab Working Paper--said that this time is not like previous ones. A group of people have come and shifted the struggle in the Arab context to the African stage, then it to the Islamic stage, then it to the European countries, so it is not permissible for us to be quiet. We must go through a process of making the Egyptian people aware, so that they may know what certain regimes which want to seize leadership of command want.

Nasr Hafez: Before going into the options, I would like to make certain limited comments on some remarks by my colleagues. It was stated that the form of the Arab Action Paper is not important now because it can be round--up and out. From my point of view, sometimes the form is no less important than the substance, especially if the paper has been prepared for study by the people. Furthermore, will this study just be for the Egyptian people, or will it be for the Arab people as well? If Egypt represents the bulk of the Arab people, there must be additions. If the situation requires adjustments, I am saying this so that there will be a wholly democratic picture.

Secondly, Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi has touched on the point that we see that perhaps there were Arab adversaries before the 1952 revolution. We do not want Egypt's Arab role to be infringed, especially since this Arab role on the modern political stage could have been established during the great

war in Egypt with al-Sharif 'Ali, thus in the present and in the past. We cannot state that there were shortcomings. Perhaps a role existed, but it was not as effective. This is because all the Arab countries were staggering under the burdens of the British mandate and occupation--or they were protectorates or something else--and thus were not countries.

Then there is a third point, the one Prof Zakariya al-Barri made. On this I would like to direct a question, while we are addressing the Arab peoples, and we want to speak bluntly: is it possible or feasible for us to distinguish a government from a people? I am not against this point, the point of addressing the Arab peoples, but would like to state that this is the most important point, especially since it was set forth at the end of the paper. Sir, you can address the peoples, and the movement of a people lies with the young, but the young cannot easily be drawn to a movement toward peace. However, you can direct to them a call for violence. Due to strange circumstances--or to our strange fate during this period, specifically, when the Arab states split up or joined together against Egypt--there also occurred the Iranian revolution, which called for an Islamic revolution. Here a new factor for which we had not made the proper calculations entered in. Therefore I consider that since one paper has now been presented it must be directly connected to the issue of the society of Arab and Islamic peoples. We must take these points into consideration.

Is the Rejection Backed by Legitimacy?

I can almost frankly state that people follow authority--this is a fact in Arab countries in general, where we state that we are the democratic state and that others are not applying democracy. Therefore when you tell these people, "We have called for peace, Arab people, be with us," they cannot be with us. We are all aware that the period of youth and labor movements never bear a theme but that they sometimes bear rebellion.

I supported the treaty forcefully and sincerely, but, as Dr Sayyid Nawfal said, this rejectionist group must state whether or not it is backed by legitimacy.

The most important thing in the paper is, How can we confront these countries?

The answer begins with another question, which is, can we correct their policies? I say we can. If any Arab country wants us to be with it, and the alignments of countries differ from time to time--even ours were different, the Soviet Union was once the major buttress and we were always saying when we were making a stand that the Soviet Union was the only country with us. Why should we deny this to others?

But Nations Consist of Interests

It might be said that there is some ambiguity or negativism in lingering and waiting, but, in my opinion, people's struggles, and sometimes wars,

prove that victory does not always go to the one who aims the accurate blows, but often, rather, to the one who sustains them and endures them. If we were to proceed to carry out the notion of the League of Islamic Arab Peoples at the present time, we might be adding to our burdens; perhaps, if we were to talk at length about this notion and this paper, I would prefer that we began with the notion of the League of Islamic Arab Peoples, because every day we find conflict in views among the rejection states, or the states which differ with us, and, if we saw that there was an improvement we would accept it--for example, the position of Morocco, today, as it is severing relations with Libya; isn't the alliance which is on our side gaining greater strength?

This is what I wanted to say--lingering. The fact is that the Arab countries need expertise and we need Arab money. Therefore there is a communality of interests; they have not committed aggression against our people to make our people leave, and we have not committed aggression against them to make us take them back. I believe that this policy is the realistic one.

An Attack on the Egyptian People

AL-AHRAM: We still have not put our hands on positive notions of a formula which we could turn into a framework for action between ourselves and the Arab countries in the future, especially since we have stipulated that the attack is not against the leaders alone but also against the Egyptian people, and is aimed at shaking the people and turning them against the natural leaders among whom they exist, not because their regime is consultative, reactionary or royal, but because their leaders are part of Egypt's nature and its historic, geographic, cultural and spiritual situation. Even though the Grand Mosque is in the holy city of Mecca, Egypt has its own spiritual position among Islamic countries.

Nasser Hattiz: I have stated my view, which is to linger and wait during this period, even if the paper states that that is negative. Perhaps, if we ourselves launch an intellectual offensive and an ideological offensive against some of these countries, that will entail a greater conflagration. In many cases what we find is that when people are quiet they may not be isolated, but the isolation may exist on the part of others, and the others may perhaps be thinking of returning. I state that my opinion is to linger and wait; perhaps that will be the solution. I did not say that it was a prediction of the future.

When his excellency the president talked about change, he said, "Ninety-five percent of the concern is with domestic affairs and 5 percent is with foreign affairs." Therefore, as I see it, I am proceeding along with the general policy of the government.

AL-AHRAM: The president's orientation of 95 percent of his efforts toward domestic affairs came about after the realities of the peace had

become stabilized abroad. It is aimed at further deepening the theory and practice of democracy in Egypt. However, no opposition paper has yet come out in any Arab country without everyone's head getting chopped off. Moreover, directing the bulk of the effort toward domestic action is aimed at self-development and the further growth of our economy, so that we may, as we always have, offer a model to which the Arab countries may be receptive.

Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim: In fact, the options are the essence of this paper, and that is the question which is being presented to the people. Before we talk about the first option we must all agree that the paper acknowledges that these options are not inflexible: the gate of individual judgment is open for the addition of further options or for the amendment of some of the options already present.

The first option, which is to linger and wait, has a specific definition in the paper; we will discuss this option in terms of this definition, which is that we should not react to any Arab stand or behavior in opposition to Egypt and what Egypt is doing because sooner or later, perhaps, they will come back to the proper course. This, as the paper characterizes it, is a position marked to some degree by negativism.

Our Course of Action Was a Group of Initiatives

The fact is that there is a contradiction between our lingering and waiting on the one hand and our course of taking action in the seventies on the other. Our taking action in the seventies was not a matter of just reacting, it was one of taking initiative. Our entering into the October war was an initiative on Egypt's part--a fact no one can argue over. It broke the cycle of no war, no peace; in what it accomplished, it was aimed at movement in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and it did away with the notion of Israeli security, among other results it successfully achieved. When efforts were made to thwart the October victory, there occurred the initiative, which was aimed at exploiting the October victory, and from the initiative there emerged the course of peace along which we are proceeding now. Therefore our position toward the major Arab cause during the seventies was not just one of reactions, but was, rather, a series of bold and daring initiatives based on a strategy. It is not reasonable, when we are discussing this situation for us to return to a policy of waiting and lingering and for our actions to be confined to reactions. Our position now must be one of continuing the strategic process which began with the October War, the initiative, and the continuing peace process.

We are now receiving a series of blows from some Arab countries aiming to lash out at the peace process and stymie it on the one hand, and to strike out at the Egyptian struggle on the other.

This series of blows and attacks delivered by some Arab regimes might sap our strength, and affect us and the peace process, because while we are

engaged in the peace process we must not seem weak in the Arab region. For us to appear weak or humiliated by any blow from any Arab regime could have a great effect on the peace process, as was stated by implication in the paper and its description of this option.

The first option, by the definition given in the paper, is to be rejected because it will just pull Egypt back.

Here a question arises: what alternative is there to lingering and waiting? How can it be modified? In reality I am not able to deal in a direct fashion with ruling Arab countries, nor am I actually able, in the media sense, to reach the Arab peoples of many Arab countries which have closed their doors to the Egyptian press. The Egyptian radio does not easily reach the Arab countries, and television remains a local medium of communication.

Thus what should I do? I will stop here because the discussion of other options, or alternative options which might arise, will answer this question.

We Are Not Renouncing Our Arabhood

Dr Sulayman al-Tamawi: The first thing I should say is that this document, as I have read it, is in reality not a document; we must not judge it as a PhD thesis but as an introduction which presents specific problems so that we may reach a solution. Ultimately, options have been set out for this solution, as the president has declared.

The fact is that a question is being raised today: are we Arabs or what? The same question was raised at the start of the 23 July revolution. Are we Arabs or non-Arabs?

The fact is that we must go back into history, in order to respond to our children. Whether we were Arabs or non-Arabs, Egypt has had a seminal place in the region. Proof of that is that when Tutmosé expelled the Hyksos he did not stop at the quarries in Sinai--he followed them to southern Syria and dealt them a crushing defeat, of which Arnold Toynbee spoke when he said in his famous statement, "He chased them out of history." The same concept was repeated centuries later by Ibrahim Pasha, who, when asked what he was doing when he was in northern Syria, said "Traveling through the Arabic-speaking area."

What concerns us here is for us not to allow our media to cause our children to doubt the Arabhood of Egypt, even if they want to. I feel that there is a big conspiracy to renounce our Arab condition and get us back to our pharaonic Egyptian origins. If we get to that, we will have achieved more for our enemies than they had hoped for, because, in my mind, the starting point is that Egypt is Arab and must stay Arab. But what will we do about our Arab condition?

The reality in our minds since the revolution has been that Arab nationalism means Arab unity. The Arab League proceeded--and history attests to this--on the basis of the unity of governments, to the point where, when Henry Far'un appeared in Alexandria, he went about in a hat, was asked "Why are you wearing a hat?" and said "It is the personality of Lebanon." The Arab League was founded on the basis of unanimity and became a motionless inner sanctum. All thinkers have studied what we should do to get moving. Popular movement is necessary. When I read the paper the president presented, I found that history was in fact repeating itself. The Arab countries, in their current state, could have done something, because there are contradictions between governments and peoples: there are contradictions in interests. The most fearsome thing that worries me is that the Arab countries will be transformed, as Europe has been, into east and west; we absolutely must not permit that. We must not ignore the concept of establishing Arab unity on a popular basis. But how? That is the problem of problems, which we must now actively proceed to discuss, and the president has raised it here. How can we address the people?

I believe that in the context of Arab unity our action should be founded on popular bases which are not in contradiction with the government. The government is proceeding and it has its emphases. I believe that the disputes now existing among governments are temporary in nature. I believe that history itself will settle them. There remains the need for me to orient myself toward the people; here I am against imposing any restrictions on Arab students in Egypt. We must take them by the hand and encourage them because we will be able to propagate our ideas through them. I, as a university professor, can feel that these young people sometimes, on occasion, are constantly protesting deep inside themselves; when we talk with them we can head them toward a sound path.

An Arabic Islamic Role

We concentrate our study on the way in which we can reach Arab peoples, we must not depend on the radio or the press. A good solution, one which I encourage, is for peoples to reach agreement and understanding on a solution one way or another; if we can do that we will reach a solution.

The second way is to be found in the book "Philosophy of the Revolution;" 'Abd-al Nasir propounded it, and the man's statement is sound to this day: Egypt has an Arab role, an African role, an Asian role, an Islamic role and a role in the worldwide context.

This notion is almost coming back. Egypt has more than one role to play. I must not confine myself just to the Arab situation, because I am confident that a scheme exists to expel Egypt from all these circles and nourish foreign powers. I believe that if the Arabs are in a perverse state now I can move in the context of other circles--the African circle, the Asian one, and the worldwide context. This requires deliberate study on our part, so I consider that a group such as today's will never be able

to provide profound solutions, although, if we succeed in setting out points and studying them informally, we will end up offering people a scientific notion and service.

How Can We Linger When Events Move Rapidly?

Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi: We are now discussing the first option, which is one of lingering. As far as my brother Hafiz' statement goes, the fact is that he is recommending the notion of lingering on certain bases or foundations about which I disagree and which I would like to respond to. First, as a general framework, I do not imagine that we can produce a solution in this symposium which will not entail another preliminary or subsequent solution. However, it is enough if we can raise the notion in an organized scientific form, that in itself will be a great accomplishment. As for the details--placing the solution in a precisely-articulated framework--I believe that this will come later. There is no doubt that the objective of Arab radios and movements is to divide the leaders from the people. Of course we are not in a position where we can say that the leaders and the people in Egypt are one and the same thing, but the fact is that this interpretation arises from their own condition--from the condition of the Arabs themselves. There is a very obvious split between rulers and people in some countries, and I believe that this is where our approach lies. The split between rulers and people can be exploited--I do not say through the radio, because the radio has a temporary effect, but not less of an effect than fighting arguments with arguments and looking at what others are saying. But for us to sustain blows, wait and linger until they quiet down, or until circumstances change, in my opinion is not permissible. More important, we cannot stand still while the world is advancing around us, racing on at terrific speed while we are standing and lingering. There is no room for lingering. What is fermenting in the whole world is not the dispute between the Arabs and us, it is economic and political struggles and we are elements in these two phenomena. We must understand what the lingering expressed in the paper is. The fact is that as alternatives there are the adaption of slogans and a continuation /of the initiative and appeal to the peoples/. That is, I cannot state that we should linger or continue, or confront and raise the same slogans. No. This is an option, that is an option, and, in the light of that, lingering has another meaning, different from the one being expressed now.

As far as people go, and how we should move people, the fact is that there are organizations, or sorts of international institutions, based on people; we often see international conferences splitting up into two factions, a faction for governments and a faction for non-governmental organizations, youth organizations, and trade union and women's organizations, and there are many groupings which have been very active on the Arab level. For example, the Federation of Arab Lawyers still has life, still holds some meetings and some gatherings. These are popular gatherings. Youth groups can meet through sports. More important, these people meet at other international conferences and meet the representatives of Iraq, Syria or

whatever. Although it is the government which sends them, when we meet them on these occasions there is very large scope for points of agreement to exist--aside from the fact that while they are compelled to state the government view in open sessions, because they cannot do otherwise, in our meetings with them we find a completely different atmosphere. We cannot leave this unexploited on behalf of the Arab cause. The fact that the president has announced that 95 percent of the orientation will be toward domestic affairs and that 5 percent will be for foreign affairs means not that we will be severing our contacts with the outside world or with other countries; the fact that our contacts with other countries will be in the range of 5 percent arises from his concern and his desire to rectify internal matters and create a country which itself will be the higher model for all countries, a model to be emulated. For example, when this country was not advanced, we used to emulate, and now it has advanced, and we have advanced, and we must pay attention to the domestic situation, so that we may remain on top and so that others will come, as they are coming now, in search of expertise. In spite of everything we still today find Iraqis coming to Egypt for medical treatment, though connections are severed, and the Saudis likewise. Concern for domestic matters has as its ultimate goal the initiatives which we have experienced and which Dr Subhi has referred to. In fact, in this area we are also proceeding with an initiative, for, when we say that we will bring the Arab countries and the Arab peoples together so that they may have a point of departure, this is an initiative in itself. It is not just based on hope, really--it is based on previous experiences. Before now, we all experienced the gatherings of people in the Afro-Asian Conference, gatherings of peoples, not governments at all--it is true that other governments were behind us, but we met and spoke on the ground that we were a people. How so? Because these conferences in fact backed all liberation movements, and very many heads of African and Asian countries headed their delegations to the conference.

For people to be in a bitter clash with leaders or with their government is a situation which is not repeated often in history, and will not be repeated in the Arab countries in this circumstance. That does not, however, mean that we ignore the fact that there are popular groupings which are hard to get through to, which we cannot easily contact. It is necessary to set forth this context and this objective, though, and strive toward it by various means. The assault on Egyptian culture, and the role of Egyptian culture, should not in my view be left unchallenged--rather, we should respond to it and there should be a dialogue. Many of us are writing honorably and decently in Arab magazines and in magazines issued in these countries, and are being read in them; through our pens, we can respond to this in a manner where we will not be acting deceitfully. We even have a historic right in this; I would not quite say struggle, but crisis. I do not believe that the position we have taken vis-a-vis the Arab countries, as far as the Palestinian cause goes, consists entirely of neglect of their role or the failure to grant that they should have a role, and that they are therefore holding a grudge against us over this role and trying to find fault with us. The fact is that right up to the

initiative we were sincerely calling for a Geneva Conference. Russia, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and all the others could have been leaders at the Geneva Conference; they could have been the ones signing the peace agreement at the Geneva Conference. What prompted us to abandon the idea of this conference was the fact that it was put off and put off, that the people who wanted to obstruct and postpone it did so, and that that became obvious, so the president was compelled to think about something else with which he could break the severity of this situation of no war, no peace and no Geneva Conference. I attended symposia in America before the president ventured on this historic initiative, and all America was talking about whether the Geneva Conference would be held or not. The whole issue, in fact, was up in the air--it was unreal. However, we have not abandoned the Arabs or distanced them from this cause, and we have not made them go away so that we could hold the absolute center of the stage. In reality it is they who have driven themselves away.

/23 Apr 80 p 67

The views of the participants yesterday, in the second part of AL-AHRAM's symposium on "the options open to the future of Egyptian-Arab relations," were crystallized by three tendencies:

A tendency, supported only by one view, which prefers to have Egypt linger and wait, even if this is described as a negative position in the face of impulsive acts of the rejectionists; the person supporting this tendency backs himself up by the fact that if we begin intellectual and ideological counterattacks, we will perhaps be aggravating the incendiary nature of the situation and doubling our burdens.

A totally contrary tendency was voiced by the majority; this rejects waiting and lingering, on grounds that that would be a regression and a renunciation of Egypt's platform in the seventies, which was distinguished by a series of initiatives which began with the October victory and ended with the peace agreements.

A third tendency stands as a middle ground between those two. This holds that waiting and lingering will not go on long, on grounds that the current disputes among governments are temporary ones, part of a stage, and cannot last, but that during periods of forbearance negative stands are not enough. Egypt must open its heart to all popular Arab groupings, deepen its bonds with the Arab and Islamic peoples, and double its cultural and educational services to young people in the Arab world, on grounds that they are "the iron link" with Egypt's Arab thinking. Although there are Arab popular groupings which it is truly difficult to reach and deal with, because they lie under the repression of their governments, there are, conversely, popular groupings, and women's, trade union, labor and vocational organizations, which their governments have not yet been able to deter from engaging in Arab activity; therefore one can start by dealing with them.

specifically, on grounds that the main base is in Damascus. It wants to free itself from this situation one way or another. There is a sort of coolness, a sort of severe tension--but not the warm relations which existed in the previous Caracas conference in October 1979.

Thus, who can I agree with in the Arab world? That is, today I am saying that this is the way to get at Arab governments: there is a specific notion which I would like to propound if I were to negotiate with anyone today. The Saudi regime is very disturbed. In the European, foreign press, it is predicted that it will collapse in a few months, or weeks. It is being challenged even by Western European countries. Naturally you have heard and read about the film "Death of a Princess"--I have seen that movie. I am referring to it in the context of Western Europe's challenge to the Saudi royal family. It was shown in London, then in The Netherlands; although the Saudi royal family, which is the stepchild of the West--the stepchild of the free world--requested and insisted that this film not be shown, it was nonetheless shown in various places. The family is now being supported neither by the Saudi people nor by the Western powers. Naturally any new revolutionary force, after the event which occurred in the Grand Mosque and the Saudi popular revolution--as they call it now in Western Europe--could present the Saudi family or regime with a complete overthrow.

A Model for Peoples Not Governments

Thus, therefore, the notion has arisen of getting in contact with the people. Allow me to jump ahead--actually, the discussion is of options, one by one--jump ahead to Articles 282 and 283 of the memorandum. Why? Because Article 282 talks and says that the strategy behind the initiative requires that Egypt present the Arab peoples, and not their rulers, with a new platform. This, in utmost brevity, will help the people overcome the campaign of vindictiveness and rancor which has become a symbol of the policy the rulers in Arab governments have pursued against Egypt and its initiatives, in order to conceal a fact, an essential point, which is that Egyptian diplomacy aimed at a comprehensive, just peace is a strategy which will help these peoples liberate themselves from conditions of oppression, will help the Arab peoples contribute to the process of building peace, will help liberate them from conditions of oppression. That is, there is the objective that we will help the Arab peoples liberate themselves from conditions of oppression. The goal in establishing the Society of Arab and Islamic peoples is not just peace, it is not just action--it is also to help the Arab peoples liberate themselves from conditions of oppression. Therefore, there has been talk about the Charter of Arab Man, because we are establishing and creating what is called the Charter of Arab Man and Arab Human Rights, gathering Arab and Moslem people in every place, time and location. This has been propounded, the means for this gathering, and this is something which really will require a long dialogue. Will it consist of labor unions? Committees? Cooperatives? Will it have a secretariat?

Man Is the Goal

There is the final paragraph, 283, whose object is that the peoples there may exercise what their rulers are prohibiting them from doing, that their free will may raise up and set an example, and that the example will be what people must represent in the Arab and Islamic world, people enjoying their natural rights to life, security and safety, and their rights to receive their share of the riches of their countries, because the goal is social, because I will not prevent a process just so that I can build a peace or a League of Arab States--with all due respect--or a League of Peoples. No, there also is a social goal and a democratic goal within these peoples for the sake of these peoples. One of the genuine goals of this paper is in Paragraphs 282 and 283, and this must be taken into consideration. How else can I attain this, except by addressing the people directly?

I do not want to go on at length, but it is clear from my statement that I support the third option, which is the initiative of addressing the peoples, so that the two objectives may be realized together at the same time. That is, the power of the address will not just come when I say "leave your rulers" for whatever reason--Syria has a quasi civil war today, Iraq and Saddam Husayn, and what he is going to the Shiites, Sunnites and minorities of his people--you all, I know and realize, you all have been looking into this matter. However, when I bring up the multi-party system in Egypt, the sovereignty of the law and so forth as a model to be emulated, these peoples want to attain something similar to what we have attained in the way of freedoms and democracy, and they might have some criticisms about them, which we will hear out to the end, the ultimate objective is to create a free democracy which no other Arab regime enjoys at this time. We are forming this society to achieve unity; this is one of the essential points of the constitution and is at the heart of Article One (Article One of our constitution, as you know), which says "The Arab Republic of Egypt is a country with a democratic, socialist system based on an alliance between the working forces of the people. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and are working to achieve the comprehensive union of this nation." No one has amended Article One of the constitution, and no one will; it remains as it is, on this basis. I do not doubt that the policy of all my brothers here--I think they all are agreed that the constitution is firmer and more solid.

"Egypt is greater than Events"

Dr Husayn Mu'nis: One of the nicest things people produce in meetings like this is to learn. The last three words which were stated have truly made my task, which I wanted to state at the outset, easier for me. This is the question I had: what is rejection? Why is there something which goes by the name of rejection? We, as historians, go back in the past a little. History today is no longer the science of the past; it has become the science of the present and the future, where we wonder what happened in October and after that. What happened is that before the October war we

were smaller than the problem of Israel; after the October war we became greater than it. They, today, are still sitting in the era of the past, the pre-October era, and are progressing along the old vision which was that there have always been two countries, or two states, in every Islamic country, the government on the one hand and the people on the other. As we see today, in Syria or in Iraq or in Libya you will find a system which existed for instance in the Egypt of the Fatimid era, when the people were Sunnite, the government was Shiite, and there was no common ground. What has happened in Egypt is that common ground between the people and the government has come about. Today, the government represents us completely. We agree with it and go along with it in every respect. When we made the initiative, they, by the nature of the case, were afraid of it, because it laid bare the truth they had always been trying to hide, which was that they--the regimes in power there--do not represent the people. They were all shaken, as a result of the initiative and the October war, because we made a decision rapidly, though perhaps that was a result of our cultural or intellectual advancement. The time has come for us to emerge from our old position of the past, in which the government stood on one side and the people on the other and we were smaller than the problem. In short, after the corrective revolution in May, we became a people which is the government, and the government is the people, without a doubt; therefore, we were triumphant in the war against Israel. This made others afraid--the initiative proved that we are able to seize the initiative on a major issue like that of Israel. I think that we in Egypt are aware today that we are much greater than the Israeli issue. We can state that it is not just the destiny of the Arab world which will be resolved from Cairo--indeed, I believe that the destiny of Israel also must be resolved from here.

"Egypt's Success Is Exposing Them"

Rejectionism may be attributed to a feeling that what we are doing in Egypt is exposing these regimes and consequently inviting their peoples to emulate Egypt's example. This is where the severe enmity on the part of some of these regimes has come about. It is an insane enmity, because it is a fear for one's destiny, without a doubt. The situation which exists in Syria today is something which is putting the friends of the /big/ families in Syria into a state of terror over their future, and it is the initiative which has caused this terror. It has shown how small the regimes are in comparison with their peoples.

On the other hand, the whole world is changing. Dr Subhi was stating that we cannot stand silent. No one in the world can stand silent. The world is changing at a very alarming speed. More than that, I consider that the framework of the Islamic world is being shattered now. The question of Afghanistan is not a minor one. It is a very serious one, because Russia was not content to have taken over Turkistan and the likes--it has also intervened in Afghanistan. Tomorrow Baluchestan, and it will be on the Indian Ocean. This is the grave situation which we ourselves realize, but they do not because they do not see the big facts.

Another thing I am observing is that America might also be feeling now that it is smaller than the world situation. We are all sensing this. In America they are saying that they are smaller! America itself will have to change, and Russia's intervention in Afghanistan should result in Russia's changing itself. What I like in this paper is that it has warned us to think of tomorrow, as of now, and to think about sketching it out. It is unreasonable for our relations with the Arabs to revert to what it once was, because the Arabs will remain Arabs but that is not the way we are. The whole world is changing today. What some people are saying, to the effect that we are unable to get to people, is not true, because we actually are getting to people. Egypt is now perhaps leading world policy in the region, and the peoples of the Arab region sense this. I believe Dr Muhyi al Din sensed this when he met the Arab delegations in Oslo. When I go to Arab countries, I indeed sense that they are feeling pride that this Egyptian people discovered how to get out of the bottleneck by itself. There are people who are logically thinking "How are the people of Egypt saving themselves, and why aren't they sinking with us?" Therefore I feel that as we are discussing this paper we might not produce a straightforward, sensitive answer, but there is nothing wrong with that--it is enough that we are raising a subject in the minds of the Egyptian people so they can answer President al-Sadat's queries on what we should be doing tomorrow. By the nature of things, when the initiative took place, we were looking to tomorrow. Before it, we were looking back, into the past, tensely, behind the wall of Israel, not knowing what to do!

Today we are greater than Israel and perhaps we can lead many other countries. As we continue on our course, we will lead the Arab countries toward their destiny. None of this will be infringing upon the important issue, which is that we must always be situated inside this Arab framework and must always be leading in this fashion, liberating the Arabs. I hope that every Arab will be aware of the simple facts facing us today, which are that the world is changing and that we cannot return to the past.

People say that it is out of the question for the Arab League to go back to what it was in the past. That is true. The whole world is changing. Our relations with Palestine, for example; Palestine cannot but become independent, and become independent along the lines we are following. It is that which scares them.

I hope that we will become wholly confident that the road we are traveling along is fully prepared and that we are armed with a sound future. For the first time in the history of the Arab nation, there is an understanding and a realization that we have united the ruler and the ruled--for the first time since the days of the first four Caliphs we have a government which, together with the Egyptian people, is a single entity. This is what is causing them to be afraid of what we are doing, and this is the cause of the hatred, rancor and discrimination on their part. However, we must proceed along our road, preserving our Arabhood completely. We must insist

on it and we must stress that this is the form we will take, even without dealing blows in exchange for blows. We are constantly delivering blows; our blows are the success we are achieving constantly, and this is what I wanted to state.

An Expression of Egypt's Morality

AL-AHRAM: We thank Dr Husayn Mu'nis. We would like to make a brief statement: Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, in his excellent description of the Arab situation, pointed out that President al-Sadat, while setting out this paper, felt pain, bitterness and grief. Therefore, there arose a question, which we raised: has Egypt fallen short in its role? The second point is, I have indeed attended many symposia in this Arab world and I am happy with this Egyptian morality, this Egyptian honor and this elevated moral level, which I have not seen in any of the Arab symposia I have attended. Not one repugnant word has come from any of us; rather, we have all been objective, and this is the morality of the Egyptians and the morality of Egypt.

So far, we have dealt with Egypt's role and its national responsibility toward our Arab nation; we have dealt with this role most concisely and with the utmost concentration, because it is a role whose self-sacrifice will never end; it is a constant, self-renewing role. If some of the honorable professors in the symposium have expressed certain observations to the effect that the Action Paper has not dealt with Egypt's role in liberating the Arab nation or protecting it from the incursions of marauders, and that it has been restricted to dealing with the role in a recent period, starting with the early 1950's, one can place that in the category of a reluctance to talk about oneself. There is no one who will deny that Egypt is the focus of Arab action, that it is the hub of Arab movement, that its role is constant and brimming over with self-sacrifice. However, there is an attack on Egypt, and this attack is a consensus of everything which motives of traditional, party, and factional narcissism have distilled and which expresses inner complexes which cover the facade of the evil faces of people possessing designs who do not devote themselves to the interests of the Arab nation and are not concerned with its destiny or with its future generations, but are laboring under a destructive narcissistic complex. What AL-AHRAM is concerned with in all this is for all the facts to be conveyed to our brothers in the Arab nation, on the terrain of true Arab reality, with complete honesty, friendship and frankness. As an entree into options which can be exercised in the future, the symposium has also dealt with relations between Egypt and the Arab countries; the discussion on this issue has been characterized by objectivity and by a feeling of responsibility, and they have been also distinguished by comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, and a review of all the circumstances and relevant conditions which surround us and the Arab situation. We are now again setting out the issue of Egypt and the new Arab situation through these options. If you will permit, we will start with Dr Zakariya al-Barri, bearing in mind that the three options are not binding on us but that we have the right to add or to provide other options.

The Notorious Alawite Regime

Dr Zakariya al-Barri: In the name of God, the most merciful, the all-compassionate: I can summarize my thinking, in a personal capacity, in the following views. First, our Arab affiliation is a fact which one cannot ignore, and it is not to our interest to have doubts about it. The Arab peoples are joined together by a spiritual, linguistic, historic, economic, and geographic unity and a unity of destiny, which only a person who denies that the sun rises could quarrel over.

Second, the Arab governments, in my opinion, are not all on the same level so that one has to deal with them in one consistent manner. The person who seeks what is futile, and comes upon that, is not like the person who seeks the truth and comes upon that. Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of the former category is the collapsing Alawite regime in Syria. From olden times, Moslems have known a group which claims through fraudulence, deceit and falsehood that it is related to Islam and pretends to be the adherent of the Imam 'Ali (may God be content with him); this was known by the name of the Ansarie /agnostic sect/ which inhabited the Levantine countries and took as its place of residence a mountain which it called al-Nusayriyah Mountain.

Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of the latter category also are the governments of the Arabian Peninsula. Perhaps one can also, as I hope, create a formula for mutual cooperation, integration and defense to confront the dangers of atheism and aggression which are positioned on their borders and on ours.

Third, there is no contradiction between joint Arab action within the limits of the possible and joint Islamic action: each of these complements the other but does not contradict it. The area which is surrounded by dangers is the Arab region and the Islamic world. One does not mean that "joint Islamic action" should be directed against non-Moslems but rather that one should roll the dangers back away from the region, unite words and deeds on behalf of mankind, and give prominence to Islam's tolerance in organizing international relations on justice, peace and social equity among nations and peoples. The Arab circle is to be considered a small one which is encompassed by a larger one, the Islamic circle; the Arabs are vehicles of Islam. Here it is proper to point out that joint Arab action exists among Arab Moslems and Christians in service of the region and in the service of peace.

124 Apr 80 p 67

The dialogue in the three previous instalments of the "symposium" addressed itself to numerous areas and reviewed many details. It started with a comment on the formulation of the Action Paper itself--regarding both the formulations it contained and its scientific and historic facts. It then discussed the philosophy and strategic goals of the paper, and

came to the three options which were set forth. Which of them would be most appropriate for Egypt during this crucial stage? The discussion on the first option, the option of waiting and lingering, was heated: does commitment to this option mean negativism and inflexibility, at a time when Egypt is known for taking the initiative? Or is it not a matter of waiting silently but a stand accompanied by an active policy domestically and abroad?

In the fourth part of the symposium, today, people's opinions brought two of the options into convergence, and the final conception of those participating in the dialogue may have approached a comingling of the two, that is, waiting and lingering combined with addressing the Arab people through all channels at the same time.

At the beginning of the discussions in the fourth instalment of the symposium, AL-AHRAM called upon Dr 'Abd-al-Malik 'Awdah, who had joined it, to talk.

Dr 'Abd-al-Malik 'Awdah: I would like to defend the first option, from my point of view. First, I have an observation on the three options. In both the style and in the structure of the way in which each option is propounded, they are formulated in a defensive fashion, not in the form of an aggressive initiative. However, in spite of this, I consider that as a result of more important circumstances, and the effects which have arisen from them in the region, and as a result of the variables within the Arab region itself, we are now facing 21 countries which are members of what is called the League of Arab States, each of these countries enjoying sovereignty and independence, but the main question among them is: how should they organize their mutual relations?

Since the League of Arab States was founded, no consensus has come into being on principles and rules regulating these mutual relations. Should they be the rules of general international law, or has a special Arab international law been devised to regulate or follow up on these relations?

This is one point. The second point is that from the language of the paper there seems to be a gap between the introduction and the options. The question as to why the situation has evolved to the state it has now reached has not been raised. What are the Egyptian and the Arab reasons for that? What complications have arisen? Here we are not apportioning blame to the right or to the left, or to one side to the exclusion of another; rather, we are looking to see what options can cope with this situation, because, if causes change, will the options change? For this reason I consider that the first option will be the best approach for dealing with the situation inside the Arab region in the coming brief period of time. However, I do not accept it as it is. Rather, I consider that the first option should be modified and stated as "watching and waiting," on condition that that be in the context of an active Egyptian policy based on, or connected to, two elements. The first element is that Egypt

should specifically announce its policy, its strategy and its viewpoint regarding the Arab region and its problems, what Egypt specifically wants from Arab relations, or how it envisions them--for here relations are not just words, are not just formulations. The important point in the relations concerns the burdens--what are the results, and what are the economic, financial and political costs which each party will defray, be that in dealing with the Palestinian cause, Camp David, or anything else?

Negotiating Over Egypt's Policy

The second element is for Egypt explicitly and officially to invite the Arab states to a negotiation, or to a method of negotiations, on this policy which has been declared by Egypt. The thing which draws one's attention is that Egypt believes in the method of negotiation as far as Israel goes--it believes that it is the one civilized way of solving problems. In spite of that, it is not using this method with the Arabs, because we know that the general Arab position is not a single one, rather, it is the result of adding up 21 positions; there is more than one dispute on these positions, and the method of negotiation propounded or proposed must revolve around a group of questions which Egypt will raise and will insist on realizing results from. What are the economic and political consequences of Arab affiliation? The expression "Arab affiliation" we acknowledge, but what consequences will it entail for us if we commit ourselves to it, and what consequences will it entail for others?

Under the rubric of waiting until this temporary period passes, Egypt can develop its powers.

Thus, I consider that the first option must be reformulated and become the slogan which Egypt will raise and with which it will enter into an aggressive policy--that is, taking the initiative of inviting others to talk with it, because, if every party sits in its place in the capital of its country, launching media attacks against others and making defamatory remarks on personal matters and private affairs, matters will become more complicated. I take it for granted that there are complications in the Arab area, but I consider it appropriate to give preference to this option in the coming temporary short period on grounds that it is the best option in relative terms. At the same time, as a final word, I am absolutely not in agreement with the second option and I caution Egypt against following it.

Regarding the establishment of a league of peoples at this time, in the context of the existing economic, social, political and cultural composition of the Arab countries and the Islamic world that would mean that we would be establishing a league of exiles!

Against the Severing of Relations

Dr Sayyid Nawfal: I am happy with what I have heard from my brother Dr Abd-al-Malik 'Awdah, but I would like to refer to what I said yesterday, which is that there are two types of relations:

The first type are diplomatic and political relations; these are in fact governed by international law, and therefore, I pointed out, we should welcome any Arab country which strives to correct its position, because international relations are a pressing need among all countries in the world. The notion of severing relations is offensive to the interests of both parties--in fact, when we established relations with Israel, one of our justifications was that we ought to recognize one another, and each of us should get to know the other completely, since we had already established peace. Thus, we established relations with the Soviet Union, the leader of the rejectionists.

Therefore we should welcome the establishment of relations, or the resumption of relations, with any Arab country which tries to correct its position; after the developments which have taken place in the rejection movement, we realize what the reasons are, where the rejection movement stands and whether or not it is legitimate. Therefore the matter which is relevant here is joint Arab action and the future of this action, because it is cause of the rejection movement and because the movement came into being in the light of this joint action, not in the context of international relations.

As regards the third option, I consider that that is sound, because it is the option which is actually at hand--that is, we, contrary to the common view, according to the information I have, have not let an opportunity pass by without trying to use it to contact the countries which have severed relations, and perhaps our position on the aggression against the Grand Mosque and other acts and on Morocco will show this--we have extended our hands and tried as hard as we were able on its behalf and we did not fall short, because, as I pointed out previously, the current policy is the policy of taking the initiative in peace and war.

We are now presenting peoples, in reality, with a model which is successful in peace, in democracy and in development.

The third option must be amended by continuing the initiative, by objective, positive media presentations, and by action in the spirit of a big brother, in order that the positions of governments may be corrected and the current Arab course may be rectified.

The rejection movement began by invitation of the Soviet Union, and the conference was held in November 1967 /sic/--1977 is meant. The countries attending were Libya, Syria, Algeria and Democratic Yemen. The Liberation Organization was forced to attend, because Yasir 'Arafat was threatened

with isolation if he did not attend; at that time he attended under compulsion and allied himself with the leaders of Palestinian terrorism, who were allied with Communism and with Libya (the tool of Communism in the region). Thus the era of terror, the era of threatening Arab countries which supported the initiative by advocating measures against Egypt and so forth, came into being.

For various reasons, including chaos in the region, the Iranian revolution, and South Yemen's threats against Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, this movement remained confined to these four countries until October 1978. The various elements of terror increased and performed their function. This is not the place to describe them in detail, but the result was that the countries submitted to Iraqi leadership of the movement; this was the condition Iraq stipulated for joining the movement. Then the Baghdad Conference was held in November 1978 and it issued the resolutions which were applied subsequently, in March 1979.

What happened after that? I state that the objective was to as they say about the peace initiative. The peace initiative succeeded and absolutely no one imagined that we would go back on it, regain the occupied territories or close the Suez Canal, which the whole world had despaired of having open! (Indeed, we ourselves had started to build oil pipelines, as had Israel.) We have also been telling the Arabs that our innate powers have grown, in both the international and the Arab context.

Moreover, the rejection movement has now reverted to drawing into itself. The result of the Tripoli Conference, which ended on the 15th of this month, was that four Arab countries stood up to all the others--stood up to the countries in the Gulf and the Peninsula.

So what has happened now is that the rejection movement has started to draw back. Disputes have arisen and they will produce their effects. Egypt is acting and is taking initiative, and the statement that we should wait is perhaps one which should require some review. This is the situation: that is, the situation is that there is movement, but, if this movement tries to detract from intellectual, cultural and artistic leaders, it will fail, because Egypt has imposed itself, its thinking and its literature on the whole Arab world.

Our Strategy vis-a-vis the Arabs

Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id: The fact is that I can now discern that the options have increased, to the point where there are three. It would be difficult for us to list the option Dr 'Abd-al-Malik has just presented under the first option, which is that of waiting and lingering, in spite of his attempt to list it under that option, because he has given it a definition which is very different from the notion of waiting and lingering. He tried to define his option through two points, which are that we should declare our policy and strategy, define what we want, and call upon the Arab

countries to negotiate on this strategy, and that we should define our economic and political commitments in a clear, frank fashion. There is no doubt that this will entail a positive attitude and the definition of a new position which it would be difficult for us to say would entail the first option, which is one of waiting and lingering; rather, it might be useful for us to list it as a fourth existing option, and there is no doubt that this in itself would be considered a contribution to the dialogue and to the paper, opening the way toward all attempts to add something new. Also, Dr Sayyid Nawfal, in his endeavor to define and provide a point of view which will emphasize that he has chosen the third option, has once again sought to amend the substance of this option one way or another; again, this has been positive. In this context, having heard these points of view, it might be useful for me to express my point of view on this subject. The fact is that in this context it is difficult for us to confine the situation to one of the options which have been presented. The option of waiting and lingering entails a certain degree of wisdom; the option of continuing the initiative and addressing oneself to the peoples again entails a certain degree of wisdom; the choice of proceeding along with slogans is to be rejected absolutely, and there is no need to speak about it. However, there are other areas of Arab action, and defining the Egyptian position makes it mandatory that we add these areas to any option which is decided on. For example, the paper does not present the option of a possibility of diplomatic dialogue with the governments of some Arab countries or all Arab countries. The paper does not posit this choice and therefore, in this matter, it is possible for us to derive the specific impression that the paper has stated that Egypt's position is one of wondering what Egypt's position toward these rejectionists must be. I state that this position must be founded upon three main approaches:

Three Approaches of Arab Action

1. The first approach is to continue the initiative. This is a matter to which the paper has referred.
2. The second approach is to address the peoples while pausing to explain what the purpose behind it is. In order to define the approach in addressing the peoples, the paper presented the issue of a League of Arab and Islamic Peoples. This is just one of the approaches we must discuss. Is it the only approach, is it the optimum approach, are there other approaches for addressing oneself to the peoples or not?
3. The third approach: active diplomatic movement on Egypt's part in its relations with the governments of some Arab countries.

These are the three foundations which I believe must be the axis for Egyptian movement in Arab relations during the next phase. To continue the initiative, undoubtedly, has its obvious justifications. The nature of the struggle now at hand in the region, the Arab-Israeli struggle, the nature of the foreign powers now present in the Arab political arena

undoubtedly drive home the fact that an objective treatment of this matter will of necessity require that it take a realistic view of matters and direct itself toward the solution which began with the president's Jerusalem initiative.

Next there is the issue of addressing the peoples. Here I must point to some observations concerning the possibility of establishing a League of Islamic Arab peoples; in reality, if we reflect upon the state of the Arab world, we will find that by nature the existing regimes are undemocratic and that these regimes consequently will not allow any individual in their populations to organize himself or be active within the League of Arab and Islamic Peoples. Consequently, as Dr 'Abd-al-Malik truly said, there will be ultimately a league of Arab people in exile and in one way or another this will lead to a clash with existing regimes. The possibility of establishing an organization of Arab and Islamic peoples requires not that the governments give their agreement but that the existing regimes be democratic and allowing differences in views and the possibility of dialogue--indeed that they permit the possibility of a clash with existing regimes, if we are to try to establish such a league. However, addressing the peoples could take place by very numerous approaches and I believe that there are fundamental axes to which Egypt could resort in addressing the Arab peoples.

Egypt must underline its clear policy toward the Arab-Israeli struggle. Egypt must constantly underline the fact that the basic strategic objective is to resolve the Palestinian issue, and that means bringing about the evacuation of Israel from the territories occupied in 1967, the right of the Palestinian people to determine their destiny and the right of the people to a Jerusalem which is Arab. Egyptian policy must stress this aspect as it is constantly stressing it now. In this form it will attract the Arab people everywhere and will stress the people's faith in Egypt's political role and conduct in Arab relations. One form in which Egypt can address itself to the Arab peoples is to stress Egyptian policy in the context of Arab-Israeli relations.

In this manner Egypt's anxiety over Arab principles and goals will, like this approach, be more effective in convincing the Arab peoples of the reality, effectiveness and positive nature of Egypt's role than anything else. Another important aspect in addressing oneself to the Arab peoples is for Egyptian policy--and this is of utmost importance--to try to concentrate on Egypt as a model for the Arab world; therein will lie the utmost success in convincing the Arab peoples of Egypt's effectiveness, its leadership and its role. This means that Egyptian leaders must place emphasis upon Egypt as a model for the Arab world. This means that they must stress democracy within Egypt and that Egypt must be a model of democracy within the Arab world. In this manner we will be able to convince the Arab world of our course, address the Arab peoples, and bring these peoples around to our point of view. We must lay emphasis on Egypt as a model of attainment of economic development. If we succeed, as

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din said, our role will not just be confined to viewing the Arab world as an issue of liberating territory or peace, but will be one of eliminating the oppression which lies over the Arab world; consequently our role within the Arab world will become a social one. In this form, if we succeed in creating a model, this could be consonant with Dr 'Abd-al-Malik's view on lingering and waiting and concentrating on Egypt as a model.

In this form, after we have adopted Egypt as a model for democracy, for social justice, for economic development, our ability to address ourselves to the Arab peoples will undoubtedly be greater than if we just established or tried to establish a League of Arab Islamic Peoples, and the scope for dialogue between us and the Arab peoples will still exist. It is true that some channels have been closed off and that some media channels have been kept from entering the Arab world, but I agree with the opinion which Dr Husayn Mu'nis expressed, and which Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi expressed, because there still is scope for dialogue and for channels. There are universities and there are university professors intermingling with university professors from the Arab world; there are students who meet with Egyptians, and there are also some magazines in existence in the Arab world in which the opportunity exists for Egyptian professors and intellectuals to write. All of these channels must be exploited. There are meetings at periodic conferences.

These are ideas on how we should address ourselves to Arab peoples. In addition, it is absolutely not permissible for us to close the door to possible diplomatic dialogues, because disputes have started to appear among Arab countries.

We must benefit from these situations by presenting the Arab people with an active Egyptian policy and giving every diplomatic channel an opportunity to make it succeed.

Dr Muhammad Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim: The first option, in terms of the concept defined by the paper, is characterized by negativism, and constitutes a danger to the peace process itself. When we understand the concept which this option embraces, we find that it is unacceptable. The second option, it is plainly clear, is rejected by all the members of the symposium. The third option contains two clauses: the first clause is continuation of the initiative and the second clause is addressing the peoples. I do not believe that there is any dispute among us concerning the first clause.

Next comes the second clause. As far as its title goes, there is no dispute over that, but the paper has defined a specific formula for addressing the peoples which could be an object of dispute among us. The paper defined the formula as establishing a league for Islamic Arab peoples, and here I pause at great length. The title of the paper is "Egypt and the New Arab Situation." From start to finish, the paper did not refer, at a

distance or close at hand, to the Islamic circle or the Islamic world, except on the last page, when it began referring to the word "Islam," the Islamic world and the Islamic peoples, it did so diffidently. Before me, par graph 283 of the paper--"Egypt in Coordinating Its Statements"--goes on to state, "so that the peoples in it may exercise (that is, so that the Arab peoples /may exercise/) what their rulers have prevented them from doing, declare their free will and be an example, as the people in the Arab and Islamic world must be. The word "Islamic" appears for the first time on the next to last page: "The people will enjoy their natural right to life, safety, security and their right to receive their share of their country's resources. Through all this, their goal is the optimum organization of the expression of their free will, in the context of sound democracy, and the clear mirror of what lies in the hearts of the citizens, be their affiliation Arab or Islamic."

Here I can state that the matter merits a pause, because there is a big difference between what has been given the name "the Arab nation" and what has been given the name "the Islamic nation." The Arab nation is land area with approximately 150 million inhabitants. The Islamic world is not a contiguous area of land; rather, there are gaps within its areas, which are separated from one another on some occasions; their population totals 800 million. The Arab nation exists; we call it a nation--we do not call it a world. The Islamic world we cannot call an Islamic nation, but we still give it the name "the Islamic world." The word "world" means that it contains a great many contradictions and incongruities. An Arab nation exists and is based on nationalism. Religion is one of the components of nationalism; because the ingredients of nationalism are numerous, one of these is religion. Thought in the Islamic world is organized; the various branches of this world contain an idea which is based on the unity of one belief to the exclusion of others. The Islamic world contains many nationalities and different peoples speaking numerous languages. It also includes massive population blocs which in their bulk exceed all the inhabitants of the Arab world together by a large amount. Moreover, the Islamic people are not only combined in countries which have a Moslem majority.

Rather, there are Islamic minorities which in some countries are larger in number than the population of Moslems in other countries which are Islamic. In India, for example, the number of Moslems is at least 70 billion, and they comprise a minority. China contains a minority estimated at 40 million. The Soviet Union contains Islamic peoples whose number is estimated at about 50 million. How can we look at the Islamic world in a light paralleling and corresponding to our view of the Arab nation?

Our connection with the Arab world, and with Arab nationalism is a genuine one which is related by roots, origins and blood. It is related by language and is related by a unity of destiny and a unity of hopes and pains, not to mention geographical ingredients and the ingredients of economic integration among its countries. To this end, when we place the Arab world alongside the Islamic world, or when we say "the Arab and

Islamic peoples"--as if the Arab peoples were not Islamic--Arab peoples are a part of all Arab peoples, as Islamic peoples. Here a reservation arises on the circle within which we will be addressing ourselves to peoples, because, if we grant that we will be adopting the style of addressing ourselves to peoples, which is relevant, then addressing ourselves to Arab peoples will not be equivalent of addressing ourselves to Islamic peoples. There will be a specific tone for addressing Islamic peoples, and addressing Arab peoples will require another tone. Islamic peoples will not adopt a unified position on history unless they face a threat from outside the Islamic world, such as the Jerusalem issue, for example. There is nothing easier than to exploit an issue like that of Jerusalem in getting the Moslems together and making exclusive use of them for this issue. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a danger which has befallen an Islamic people from outside the Islamic world, but our Arab issues, and the matter of addressing the Arab peoples, will require a different style on a different level; it will not allow us to wait until an Arab people are threatened by a danger coming from outside the Arab nation, as is the case with the circle of the Islamic world.

The Language and Axis of Address

However, we are completely influenced by everything which happens inside the Arab world, and therefore I am introducing this reservation regarding the merger of the Arab and Islamic peoples which appears at the end of the paper. This merger is not wholly compatible with the thrust of the paper in its entirety. The paper concerns the new Arab reality (not the reality of the Islamic world) and our position regarding Arab countries which have taken a specific stand regarding the peace initiative, not Islamic peoples or countries. Thus there is agreement over the first phrase in the third option, continuation of the initiative, and there is a reservation regarding the second clause--a reservation concerning the only formulation the paper has specified for addressing peoples. Thus, in the next stage, addressing peoples will not only be a matter of addressing the Arab peoples or addressing the Islamic peoples--the opportunity will exist to address the peoples of the whole world. How can we hesitate to address the Islamic peoples when we are given an opportunity to do so? How can we hesitate to address the European peoples when we are given an opportunity to defend our cause? How can we hesitate to address the American peoples when we are given an opportunity to do so? The scope exists for addressing the peoples all over the world and is not restricted to the Arab peoples or the Islamic peoples alone. The only point in the matter is that there are ways and levels of addressing peoples. The way we address the Arab peoples differs from the way we address Islamic peoples, address African peoples, and address peoples situated outside these three circles. Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id referred to numerous ways of addressing peoples. These channels exist and can be set right, supported and enlarged. This is completely possible and I believe that this is the possible, scientific formula for addressing the peoples in the coming period. Regarding the attempt to establish a League of Islamic Peoples or a

League of Arab and Islamic Peoples, the paper itself has raised some questions which contain many dangers between the lines, if we are to think of establishing such a league. Establishing a League of Arab Peoples will require first of all a conscious, thorough study of the domestic political composition of each Arab and Islamic country, in terms of its regime, the existence or nonexistence of parties, and the political structure of the state. None of this is available to us now and thus we cannot easily reach agreement on establishment of a League of Arab and Islamic Peoples; the subject requires the amassing of abundant data and information on these countries, in terms of governments and people, before we can express our opinion on the possibility of establishing this kind of league. The paper itself has set out a number of questions which make us somewhat wary of approaching the recommendation of formulating this league as the only formula for addressing peoples!

At the end of the dialogue, before the conclusion, Dr Zakariya al-Barri requested correction of an expression which appeared in a statement he made yesterday; if not corrected, that could give a meaning which is totally different from what he intended. In voicing his opinion on the need for Egypt to distinguish among Arab governments in its treatment, on grounds that they are not all on the same level, there appeared the statement: "The person who seeks what is futile, and comes upon that, is not like the person who seeks the truth and comes upon that."

The correct version of this saying, if it is to impart the correct, intended meaning, is:

"The person who seeks what is futile, and comes upon that, is not like the person who seeks the truth and misses it."

Arabhood and the Arabs

In the Alexandria Protocol of 7 October 1944 and 23 March 1945, agreement was reached on establishment of an Arab League, to be named the League of Arab States; seven countries, among them Egypt, agreed that every Arab country would have the right to join this league. At that time "Arabhood" was defined as embracing everyone who spoke the Arabic language--whether he be Moslem, Christian or Jew--lived in the Arab countries between the Gulf and the Atlantic, and was Arab by nationality.

Bourguiba: Arab Egypt Has Influenced Every Arab

Dr Sayyid Nawfal related that he made a visit to Tunisia, met President Habib Bourguiba, and stayed up late with him in the Carthage Palace, where a Tunisian singer was singing an Egyptian song with an Egyptian accent. The Tunisian President's comment on that was that that was not odd--Egypt has imposed its art, its thinking and its literature on the Arabs. He stayed up the night talking with Habib Bourguiba about Egypt's Arabhood and its influence and organic relationship with the Arabs since ancient times.

In this final instalment on the symposium, those participating in the dialogue established points of utmost importance. After all the opinions and ideas they discussed and propounded, they all agreed that the events of the coming days, up to next 26 May (the target date for the autonomy talks), were truly to be considered a decisive period, during which the dialogue must go on, but that one must await its results so that its course might be defined in a realistic manner!

Dr Hurayn Khallaf: In my view, the option I prefer is the third, which talks to us about addressing the peoples. However, we must not just content ourselves with addressing peoples, because first we must wonder in what manner, and how, the address will take place, which is not a simple matter. It requires agencies and instruments, and if these agencies do not exist, cooperation will be inhibited and exchanges--even exchanges of ideas--may be inhibited, because exchanges of ideas need points of contact where views may interact and result in a crystallization in the form of resolutions or unified ideas. Then, will this league be for the common people alone, or will it be for the people and the government? In my opinion, it must be a league for the people and the government and not just for the people. If it is just for the people, it will not be able to function in a country like those in the Arab region. First, it will need to make resolutions and to have these resolutions implemented and respected and produce a conclusion. If it is for the common people, who will guarantee that resolutions are issued and that the resolutions are respected? We know that what has afflicted the Arab League most of all was that sometimes it could not issue a resolution and that at other times it would adopt a resolution but the resolution would then not be implemented by the countries which did not want to implement it! What would the situation be if we produced a league for the common people which wanted to express its ideas? Whose ideas? Whose views? Not the ideas of governments, but ideas which could perhaps be in opposition to governments! Can a league of this sort be relied upon for common Arab action?

Thus I believe that it must be for the people and for the government at the same time. Also, and in particular, we must not try to leap to peoples over the heads of the governments through this league. I am afraid that such a leap might not succeed on many occasions and, if it did, the results might perhaps not be ones we would be satisfied with. Naturally, after this, there remains the notion of whether or not it will be Arab and Islamic at the same time.

In my belief, it would be best if there were a link between the Arab League and the Islamic League.

Finally, I would like us not to talk a great deal about leadership but about Egypt's superiority in all areas, and for us to preserve this superiority. Likewise, we should talk about the model. In fact, this notion of a model is an obscure one. What do we mean by it?

What do we mean by the notion of a model? We are presenting a model for Arab action and we are happy to hear that this model will include the notion of deepening democracy as well as the notion of development, social justice and so forth. It is true that these countries are absorbing something from Egypt related to democracy, social justice, and development; however, except for these matters, I do not consider that there is a model which we can or which it is in our interest to offer to countries which differ, or some of which differ, from us, since each of them is a model in itself. Therefore I do not believe that it is proper for us to insist on this idea of the model.

Egyptian Democracy

AL-AHRAM: We agree with Dr Khallaf in excusing ourselves from imposing our leadership or talking about it, because that will create complexes among certain people. However, what I do disagree with him over is that we must concentrate on the Egyptian model. Let us give an example of this: a group of writers and literary people is in opposition, whether organized into political parties, Communists or independents. They are the greatest model of Egyptian democracy and the sovereignty of the law.

Coping with the Crisis

Dr 'Abd al-Malik 'Awdah: In my opinion, the current crisis in Arab relations is the consequence of more than the initiative; the initiative occurred, and created part of the crisis, but there was a bigger crisis, which Egyptian policy, through this paper, is supposed to call for coping with. Confronting the crisis means describing it; then we will propose options. The options which have been presented are rubrics from which we will choose and whose contents we will change. When I defended the notion of lingering and waiting, I had it in mind that the third option would be accompanied by a practical executive step, namely the establishment of a league of peoples. Therefore, I embraced lingering and waiting, and at the same time recommended that to prevent inflexibility or negativism an active, effective Egyptian policy should be carried out and negotiation should start with those people, provided that Egyptian policy be set forth and that it stipulate its conception of Arab relations in their totality, including the League of Arab States (will it survive? will it be modified?) Egypt must set forth its strategic notion of these relations in full and call upon the Arabs to negotiate over it. I am stating this so that Arab relations will not be disrupted and so that the crisis embracing the Arab world now will not increase, in an attempt to describe it and create a relatively optimal solution for escaping from it.

AL-AHRAM: The program for the discussion revolved around the three options. It was clear that two tendencies existed:

The first supported the first option, although it had some observations to the effect that it be offensive, not defensive; it considered that there

was no dividing line between the first and third options, but that the third option was a continuation of the initiative. It was clear from the structure of the paper that it was based on one thing, namely the establishment of a league for Arab and Islamic peoples. From the course of the discussion it was clear that there were new options in addition.

Patience Is Required Now

Dr 'Abd-al Wahhab 'Arhmawi: I consider the three options as one, or as a group of introductory acts which will lead to one option. Waiting and lingering is a style, not an option. It is waiting.

Perhaps those who have deviated and created disturbances will quiet down and reconsider. Events are proving that there will be a reconsideration, even if it is not imminent; these are the harbingers of a reconsideration. I will add specific information: following the initiative, and after the Baghdad Conference and the peace treaty, I had the opportunity to visit a number of Arab countries. A struggle exists and is most intense, and what I am saying is no secret. I met with most of the heads of the Gulf states, if not all of them, and what they said was plain: they are completely in favor of Egypt's approach, but Egypt must be patient and wait until the pressure on us disappears. Thus, in this sense, the style of waiting and lingering is a persuasive one and is well known in the whole world. America has been waiting for months in the hostage crisis. However, that does not prevent action, and here lies the third option, which is to continue the initiative and address the peoples. As far as that goes, in my mind a new option is being crystallized; that is, how can we turn the Arab League into a league of peoples in the sense that we can change its course, or change its working method or orientation, so that it will be an instrument for addressing peoples and not an instrument for addressing governments? In our opinion it is the government which takes a decision, governments do not represent their peoples or look after their interests, and these governments have placed Egypt, or have placed a curtain, between Egypt and the Arab peoples which we must transcend, because we used to reach these peoples through the league. Today we must reach them directly. For that notion I will take up what is discussed in Article 284.

How will the steps to found this league start? Or how will the initial steps to convert the existing Arab League into a true league of peoples begin? Here I fully support Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim on the issue that it is for the Arab peoples and not the Islamic peoples.

I state that here the founding steps must be preceded by preparatory steps, and I state that the founding steps are a matter which will come at a subsequent stage, a stage in which lingering and waiting will be useful. I propound this notion and I have some general foundations or rules guiding me in regard to the transformation process.

First, I rule out the fact that resolutions should be issued by us. Rather, I would try to gather people around the notion and around specific goals. If you will permit me, I will set out some of these goals as examples, not as exclusive items. These are the attainment of a unity of thought and action.

First, this issue requires that convergence be attained, in order that we may arrive at unity of thought! Thus I will develop a long stage during which I will bring these Arab peoples closer together, while admitting that there are radical differences in social and economic beliefs, and so forth.

Planning for Phased Action

Dr Fu'ad Muhi-al-Din: How can we start the League of Peoples? Shall we begin with Egypt, as a state and a people? Shall we merely begin with a secretariat general which will plan in stages? Will we begin by setting out a charter?

The construction process is long and hard. It will require time--it could go on, and there will be a sort of requisite lingering, in an indirect form; naturally, the league will not be accessible to those who stay away from it.

Al-AHRAM: Time is passing. Do we need another session?

Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi: It strikes me that it is possible for us to conclude with the choice which is now being crystallized, provided that we return and inaugurate another symposium on the details at another date!

Hasan Hafiz: We must wait until after 26 May.

Dr Sulayman al-Tamawi: Many ideas will change after 26 May. If we succeed in putting the Palestinians on the road, they will all reconsider and these ideas will consequently be beside the point; we will come back again to the real Arab League. I can give an example. The day the president went to Jerusalem, I was on pilgrimage, by invitation of the Saudi government at that time. The prince of the pilgrimage surprised me by telling me, "Did you know that your president is in Jerusalem?" The fact that the president had gone to Jerusalem created an electric shock which many could not absorb, or whose significance many could not understand.

Participating in the Symposium: Dr Fu'ad Muhi-al-Din; Dr Sayyid Nawfal; Dr 'Abd-al-Malik 'Awdah; Dr Muhammad Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim; Dr 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-'Ashmawi; Dr Husayn Khallaf; Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi; Dr Zakariya al-Barri; Dr Maurice Makramallah; Dr Sulayman al-Tamawi; Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id; Dr Husayn Mu'nis; Hasan Hafiz. For AL-AHRAM: Zakariya Nil; Muhammad Zayid; Mahmud Murad; Khamis al-Bakri.

Egypt's Role in Defending the Arab League

To what extent should Egypt play a role in repelling an aggression against any Arab country exposed to foreign aggression? For example, what will it do if Iran carries out its threat and commits aggression against Bahrain or some other country? Will Egypt continue to be committed to the Joint Arab Defense Treaty?

AL-AHRAM raised these questions and the symposium unanimously agreed that the Egyptian role of defending the Arabs and committing itself to the defense treaty would remain. Dr Fu'ad Muhi-al-Din said that the Iranian threat is unreal and is the result of Iraq's demand that it return the three Arab islands of greater and Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa. In general, we are committed to a mutual defense if any Arab country which has been attacked so requests. We are genuinely and firmly committed to this and we will defend any Arab country against any foreign aggression which takes place against it.

Egypt and the Palestinians: What Did 'Arafat Say?

AL-AHRAM raised Egypt's present role and its current discussions on autonomy, and the statements some have been making on who gave Egypt the right to talk in the name of the Palestinians. AL-AHRAM stated that although such things are being said, Yasir 'Arafat expressed distress- in front of eyewitnesses- on hearing that Egypt was going to abandon its role on autonomy. 'Arafat said, "These discussions are to be considered the first acknowledgment of the Palestinian people, and all we ask of Egypt is that it take a hard line with the Israelis."

Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id said that it was necessary to continue this, because the Palestinian cause is an Arab cause which forms part of Egypt's Arab conviction and it is necessary for Egypt to take a hard line in the face of Israeli complications. Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim said that these talks are a choice in favor of Egypt's Arabhood and therefore Egypt must continue on account of its commitment to the Palestinian cause, the focus of the Arab cause; if it abandons it, the peace agreement will become a separate treaty, and that is out of the question. We must prove that we are most firm in our adherence to Arabism and Palestine, and all those present followed one another in affirming that Egypt should continue from this starting point.

Dialogue with the Arabs--How and with Whom?

During the symposium, the need was repeatedly expressed for continuing the dialogue with the Arab countries through numerous channels, among them diplomatic ones. However--as AL-AHRAM asked--who will the dialogue be with, and, if we assume for the sake of argument that it occurs, on what basis will it be?

Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id said "It is necessary to study in advance the conditions in each Arab country in isolation, in terms of its regime and its way of thinking. It is possible for us to discern two trends in the Arab nation now: a trend led by what is called the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front--Libya, Algeria, Syria, Democratic Yemen, and the Liberation Organization--and another trend led by Saudi Arabia which consists of the Gulf countries and others. Although the two trends reached agreement at the Baghdad Conference, numerous contradictions exist between their member states. During the current stage I consider that this is related to the results of the autonomy talks and to recognition that Jerusalem is part of the West Bank. On the other hand, a contradiction exists among Perseverance Front states, between Algeria and Morocco, between Libya and the organization, and so on. Here one could start a kind of dialogue, not diplomatic necessarily, but cultural and economic, as a start, to stop mutual media campaigns. This is possible and significant."

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din said that serious efforts had already been made at the highest levels with some Arab governments but they did not succeed. Differences arose over the initiative and therefore over what the dialogue would revolve around. But the initiative is first of all an initiative, and we are not ready to turn back! The fact is that rejection of the initiative proceeds from three premises:

1. A Marxist rejection. This has been clear and specific, since we expelled the Soviet experts and Moscow's influence in the region declined. In addition, the countries following Moscow have taken a stand against us.
2. A Palestinian rejection. This comes basically from groups which also revolve in the Soviet orbit, such as the groups of George Habash, Nayif Hawatimah, Ahmad Jibril and so forth. Although Yasir 'Arafat is a moderate, he cannot take a decisive position!
3. Rejection for reasons of leadership. For example, the rulers of Saudi Arabia were angry because they did not learn of the initiative before it occurred, and, as a result of its pressure some countries followed it; then, for example, Morocco played a part in the discussions, then joined the rejectionists because we took a neutral position in its struggle with Algeria over the Sahara.

A Unified Formula Which the Symposium Agreed to

The symposium which AL-AHRAM held, and whose minutes it published over the past 4 days, reached a specific formula on the future of Arab action and Egypt's role in the formula in the light of current Arab-wide and international variables. The formula the symposium reached, was the result of discussions which were heated and agitated, which agreed and disagreed, but occurred with extreme bluntness and more extreme objectivity. This formula reaffirmed:

1. That the Arabhood of Egypt is an issue which will not admit of debate or even of reflection. Although Egypt's 1956 constitution stipulated for the first time that Egypt is a part of the Arab nation, its role in Arab action preceded that date by hundreds of years. Even though Egypt was not the place where the revelation /of Islam/ occurred, it made a great contribution in protecting and spreading Islam, not just through al-Azhar for a thousand years and more, but even earlier, when it gathered up, preserved and disseminated the /Islamic/ legacy. While Egypt has borne the burden of the Arab-Israeli struggle for 30 years and more, it was the country which defeated the Mongols hundreds of years ago and liberated the Arab countries from them--indeed, expelled them from all history--and bore the burden of defending the region thousands of years before that, even before Islam, without imperialistic intentions but out of awareness of its role and of the fact that the security of the area is indivisible.

2. Egypt has done all this throughout history and has continued to be the center for the intellectual, cultural and artistic dissemination of civilization. Its role in these and other fields cannot be ignored. It has sacrificed and will continue to sacrifice without boasting--indeed, because of numerous circumstances, it has been in the position of leadership and dominance; that is its destiny and one must not boast of it or feed provocative declarations which are nourished by elements which aim at fragmenting Arab power and unity. This spirit, in this sense, must dominate and must be reflected in the media.

3. With respect to the three options set forth in the paper "Egypt and the New Arab Situation," concerning what should be done in the future, namely:

Lingering and waiting;

Proceeding with slogans;

or addressing the peoples;

The symposium, with full conviction and realization of the facts of the situation, unanimously considers that the second option is to be completely rejected, lest we slide into labyrinths of bidding contests, bickering and irresponsibility, and the whole Arab nation slide into what is against its interests and goals. As a consequence, the first and third options must be combined by merging them and modifying the formulation in a manner which will express strategic fundamentals which are based on:

Waiting and lingering until the present tumult quiets down and some people regain command of their senses. This is not negativism--rather, in a positive sense, it represents an active Egyptian policy moving in all spheres.

During this period, Egypt will concentrate on domestic affairs, so that it may become a model country by deepening democracy, freedoms, social justice and its intrinsic strength.

It is necessary to develop bridges with our brother Arab states, either by popular contacts, through trade unions, authorities and various groupings, to explain our positions, or by the presentation of national Arab and unity films in our press articles by Egyptian intellectuals, cultural figures, and journalists in Arab countries.

Egypt will open its mind and heart to every Arab dialogue and is prepared for diplomatic contacts with any country which corrects its course.

During this period, it will be possible to start studying an Islamic league. Some people consider that all the Arab countries are one nation with one nationality, one ideology and one set of interests within a specific geographical setting while the Islamic world is far-flung over various areas and its strategy or interests are not uniform, might be contradictory and will only mobilize to confront an important event which is related only to Islam and sacred places. This League of Arab Peoples must be preceded by a broad, detailed study which takes numerous criteria into account. It must not for example be for Arab exiles so much as an expression of the whole Arab people. The symposium agreed that a study of this issue must wait until after the coming 26 May and the results it produces, especially regarding autonomy and the issues resulting from that.

4. In any event, Egypt must continue to fulfil its Arab commitments and be present on all stages of activity.

11447

CSO: 4802

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN DISCUSSES NEW CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Apr 80 p 6

/Article by Mustafa al-Damarani: "Mansur Hasan Declares: Cultural Democracy Has Become a True Fact And This Is Its Course"/

/Text/ In a special interview, Mansur Hasan, minister of state for the presidency and supervisor of culture and information, declared that he is now busily engaged in setting forth the new strategic bases for our culture, in which, following President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat's decree organizing the cultural sectors, for the first time cultural figures will bear the responsibility for culture in our country.

The minister said, "Through this new organization, we may have realized all cultural figures' hope of assuming responsibility for themselves by themselves in the area of culture, cultural planning and implementation of the cultural plans they want. Therefore the launching of a cultural renaissance in Egypt will be the responsibility of cultural figures alone, and it is they who will bear the responsibility for this renaissance before the people."

The minister said, "The Supreme Cultural Council, which has taken the place of the Minister of Culture in the new organization, will hold its first meeting next 15 May; this will be preceded by the preparation of the executive resolutions needed to form the agencies belonging to the Supreme Council, establish new companies and receive nominations for membership in such specialized committees as the committees on film, the theater, writers and so on. In its first session, the council will review the nominations presented to it alongside the resolutions required for the process of organizing the secretariat general and the executive agencies."

The minister declared that the members of the committees which would be included in the council would be cultural figures. He said, "I am taking this opportunity to direct an invitation to all Egypt's writers, literary figures and artists to join us in nominating all persons they consider capable of bearing responsibility for cultural activity in the coming stage. My office will receive these nominations from _____s cultural

and artistic bodies, trade unions, societies and federations from today, Saturday, until next 5 May; the nomination should state the committee in which the nominee is to be enrolled and in which he can offer efforts which will add something new to the cultural process."

Continuity between the Generations, and Youth and Intellectuals

On the new philosophy behind the organization, the minister said, "Our philosophy is essentially embodied in cultural democracy, which, in my view, means that young people will account for a proportion of the organization of the council committees which could be as high as 30 percent. Since we have had the goal of not transferring cultural figures to retirement, in the new organization, the presence of young people alongside Egypt's cultural experts and leaders will create what is called a continuity among generations, and it will create a sort of balance between the ideas of cultural leaders and young intellectuals and their new schools. In addition, it will create a continuous dialogue between the two generations, which will ultimately lead to beneficial things for cultural activity itself, bringing culture back to its golden age, to the time of Taha Husayn, al-'Aqqad, al-Mazini, al-Rafi'i and others who have influenced our cultural life and whose fruits we continue to gather to this day."

No Favoritism in Selecting Supreme Cultural Council Members

On the criteria which must be observed in selecting members for the committee to be included in the Supreme Cultural Council, Mansur Hasan said, "We have finished setting out general criteria and objective conditions which people granted responsibility for cultural action must possess. Among the most important of these is that the member possess a high degree of cultural and moral excellence, qualifying them for selection, in order that they be qualified to bear cultural responsibility and so that we may thereby guarantee that every cultural position be occupied by people who are truly worthy of it."

They Are Not Government Committees in the Traditional Sense

Regarding the nature of the new council committees and whether they would be like any of the government committees we see today, the minister said, "The Supreme Cultural Council Committees will be based on a new concept which differs completely from that of government committees; in fact, they will be committees of an independent nature, remote from governmental bureaucracy; they will have their own philosophies, which will be consonant with the nature of the new system. They will be far removed from the cliquish atmosphere cultural agencies have often suffered from, which have obstructed their smooth operation. More important than that, the areas of competence of these committees will not be limited to studying, planning or setting out recommendations; they will go beyond that, to the supervision of executive processes themselves. To bring this about, every committee will itself be the one to act in regard to the budget related to

the sector in which it functions. In view of these committees' vital role in taking charge of responsibility for the cultural renaissance in Egypt, we will try to attract personnel who are really able to contribute to the forging of a cultural renaissance which will be a pioneering one in this region."

A General Cultural Conference To Evaluate the Committees' Actions

On the steps to follow the meeting of the Supreme Cultural Council, Mansur Hasan said, "After the council meets and forms its committees, I will meet with all members of the committees to explain to them their role in the new organization. This will be manifested in their bearing responsibility for collective cultural leadership on behalf of the renaissance we are arranging. I will ask every committee to start studying the sector it will be specializing in immediately so that it will ultimately provide us with an action paper in which the situation in this sector today is most clearly described, from all aspects, what it must be, and the steps the committee will take to bring this situation to the goal which it desires to attain. After the committees finish setting out their conceptions and start their work, we will come to next 1 October, when we will hold a general conference to be attended by the broad cultural base. In the course of this conference, the activities of the committees, along with the accomplishments they have made during the year and each committee's plan for the coming year, will be reviewed through a true, objective evaluation of cultural activity. The conceptions these committees set out will be the working papers in this great conference, in the sense that the leaders responsible for cultural activity will present their notions to the broad base of cultural figures, to seek their opinions and approval on these notions before putting them into practice.

Next 8 October Will Be Cultural Achievements Day

"By this arrangement, 8 October, in which President al-Sadat will witness the concluding session of the conference in the morning, will be Arts and Culture Day, the holiday for celebrating the cultural achievements the council made during the year and the day on which it announces its plan for the coming year as approved by cultural figures. That will be proclaimed in the presence of President al-Sadat; on that day the names of the nominees for Arts and Culture Day prizes will be announced and the president will honor them on that day. Thus the nominations for prizes on that day will be not through a government committee or individually but through the base of cultural figures in Egypt."

Private Sector Support for Fine Artistic Production

As regards the establishment of new movie companies, the minister said that the new organization would provide for a movie production committee which would be able to recommend a selection of stories of a high level

worthy of Egypt's name to private sector producers for production. Among the duties of the committee would be stipulating that these narrative stories be subsidized and that aid be provided to the private sector to produce films of this sort.

Transformation of the People's House to the House of Children's Culture

The new organization will be devoting special attention to children's culture by subsidizing and publishing children's books and by solving the problem of printing as a basis for disseminating culture. Therefore, the council will try to realize a broader policy in the publishing field in general, in order to provide everything of benefit in the movement of literature, thought and art. To achieve this, every publishing house in Egypt will be represented in the agencies of the Supreme Cultural Council, so that they may bear their responsibilities and help set forth a new publishing policy for providing books in luxury printing and books in ordinary printing accessible to people from various classes of the public who are interested in culture. To emphasize the council's interest in children, it has been decided that the People's House will be transformed into a publishing house specializing in children's culture, and that in addition a children's cultural center will be among the agencies of the Supreme Cultural Council.

Guiding the Role of Art Collection Supervision

"The new organization has not neglected the matter of supervising art collections and the important role cast upon its shoulders," Mansur Hasan said. "According to this organization, supervision will be a part of the secretariat general of the organization, subject to the regulations and policy the council sets out. Thus the role the office of supervision of collections will be guided in accordance with this organization in order to promote the movement of society in the context of preserving its genuine values and traditions.

We Have Taken No Decision without Referring to the Council

"To emphasize the responsibility of intellectuals in bearing cultural responsibility, I will set out new customary procedures concerning the resolutions I will have the power to adopt. The sense of these procedures will be that I will adopt no decisions on cultural matters, even if I have the authority to do so, without the participation of the Supreme Cultural Council or one of the committees in whose area of specialization the decision lies." Thus Mansur Hasan asserted that the new cultural organization will be a model of what practice should be in other sectors of the society.

Unesco Requests the New Organization Formulation

The minister's office received a memorandum from the Unesco organization requesting a copy of the formulation the president has approved bearing on organization of the cultural sectors, in order to discuss ways for member countries which wish to establish a new cultural renaissance in which intellectuals themselves will assume responsibility for culture in their countries may use and apply this formulation.

The Supreme Council--and the National Council

The discussion shifted to the National Cultural Council and whether its mission would conflict with the new Supreme Council. The minister said, "The objective of the National Cultural Council, as with all specialized national councils, is to investigate and study our culture and to plan for the future--that is, over dimensions of time which go beyond the situation we are measuring, that is, a further exploration of the horizons of culture up to 2000. Our new cultural council will set out an annual strategy for culture and will work to carry it out. In general, the two councils will complement each other. One of the most important characteristics of the Supreme Cultural Council is that it has placed the planning for cultural projects and implementation of these projects in the hands of the intellectuals themselves."

20 Million Pounds Will Be Transferred to the Council

With regard to the budget with which the Supreme Cultural Council will operate, the minister said, "The ministry's budget, in this year's government budget, which comes to 20 million pounds, will be the budget of the Supreme Cultural Council itself. This budget will be transferred in its entirety to the Supreme Council following the president's decree on cultural organizations, and the Supreme Council will be considered in charge of culture in Egypt."

The Requisite Workforce in the Cultural Agencies

The discussion moved over to the current situation of employees in the ministry's agencies and to the talk which has been circulating on the new companies to be established and the new method of operation which the council will follow. The minister said, "Naturally, the new executive agencies and the companies which will be established and will be under the council will absorb a large number of existing employees, in order to benefit from their expertise. However, in accordance with the new system and the new method, in terms of workforce, the volume of the new executive agencies will be only what is required, and only as great as the volume of actual requirements for employees in these agencies. Thus if there are some employees surplus to the needs of an agency, we will deal with them in such a way that they will be used in other places in keeping with their specializations. The rule we will follow in promulgating any organization

will be the public interest. In the first place, the interests of the job will require that the work be successful and humane at the same time--it must not be at the expense of any employees. In general, the government which is responsible for the job is also responsible for the citizen."

Artistic Centers and Branches

The conversation touched on the branches of the Supreme Cultural Council according to the new organization. Mansur Hasan said that this will include four important branches. Each branch will contain a number of committees, as follows:

The Cultural Branch: This will include Committees on Antiquities, Cultural Heritage, Children, Cultural Exchange, Mass Culture, Publication, Cultural Societies, Radio, Television, the Press and Administrative Development.

The Arts Branch: This will include Committees on Plastic Arts, Theater, Movies, Music, Folklore and Architecture.

The Literature Branch: This will include Committees on Literary Studies, the Short Story, Poetry and Translation.

The Social Sciences Branch: This will include Committees on History, Geography, Education, Psychology, Philosophy, Society, the Law, Political Science, Economics and Islamic Jurisprudence.

The new council will include four art centers:

The National Motion Picture Center: under this will be documentary films, experimental films, film culture, film archives, prizes and festivals.

The National Theater Center: under this will be dramatic arts, museums, the theater library and archives, projects and research.

The National Plastic Arts Center: under this will be fine arts, museums and art centers.

The National Children's Culture Center: under this will be research, studies, artistic experiments and children's clubs.

Art Houses

The stage: under this will be the National Theater, the modern theater, comedy, the avant garde and puppet shows.

Music: under this will be the Arab Music Group, the Cairo Symphony Orchestra and the Egyptian Opera Troupe.

Folklore: this will consist of the National Folklore Troupe, the Reda Troupe, the National Circus and the musical stage.

11887

CSO: 4802

KURDS LEARN TO STOP TEHRAN'S TANKS

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 25 May 80 pp 71-76

[Article by Giancesare Flesca: "To Shoot a Kurd Is Not a Sin"]

[Text] Mahabad. Up to now, this is the darkest page written by the Islamic Republic. It is a page that reflects, like a deforming mirror, today's anguish, paranoia, violence and weakness, which could tomorrow also open an even more disquieting chapter. The 6 million Kurds living in Iranian territory are in danger. At best they will continue to suffer brutal repression. At worst, they will face mass extermination. It would not be the first, nor the last, in the history of this people without a homeland, without fortune and without hope.

Harsh repression has already begun. For 2 weeks, the cities of southern Kordestan have witnessed extremely violent clashes. On one hand are the Iranian army and the "Pasdaran," the revolutionary guards loyal to the regime. On the other, the "Peshmargan," the Kurdish resistance fighters. In the middle, the civilian population. South of the city from which I am writing, which is the political capital of the region, within the radius of just a few kilometers, there are hundreds of dead, thousands of wounded and 110,000 refugees. People abandon inhabited centers, where street fighting takes place, where heavy artillery shells or aviation bombs fall, in order to take refuge in the countryside. There is no supply of food or medicine. The central government has set up an economic blockade. The roads leading to Kordestan have been blocked by the army. In some cities, there is mention of cholera.

I arrive in Mahabad on a sunny afternoon. The plane that took off from Tehran landed at Ourmieh, a large village in the extreme western party of the country, inhabited half by Kurds and half by Turks. This is the home base for the Iranian Army's 64th Armored Division, and this latest war began just a few kilometers from here. Parallel to the national highway is an unpaved road that winds through mountains and valleys, skirting the Iraqi and Turkish borders, then leading to Maku and the Soviet border. Those in power in Tehran are convinced that the Russians have not aided the Kurdish rebellion for quite some time. Despite this, 3 weeks ago notice to close

that road was issued in order to halt possible shipments of arms or funds. Or more simply, it was done in order to isolate the insurrectional flame from that other border dilemma, the one in Azerbaijan, populated by Turks faithful to the dissident Ayatollah Shariat Madari.

The commanders of the 64th Division initially assigned the task to a Kurdish tribe considered particularly mercenary, that of the "traitor" Rashid Djahruquiri, whose name means "he who conquers the world." But Rashid wasn't even able to capture the road. Neither he nor the thousand rifles in mint condition issued to his men were able to stop the others, the Peshmargan, who are fighting for regional autonomy. In a matter of hours, thousands converged from both the north and the south forcing the warlord to beat a hasty retreat back to his holdings. Only then did the army intervene.

"They sent the air force and tanks," explained the head of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Abdel Rahman Qasemlu, "in an exceptional deployment of forces. They wanted that valley at all costs, perhaps because that is where I was born, and it has my family's same name, Qasemlu. The men were very afraid of the tanks. The Phantom jets do not scare them. In these mountains all they can do is burn trees. But they didn't know how to stop tanks. We are accustomed to fighting with rifles or machineguns. The old bazookas are useless against the chieftain's armor. Then they learned how to put hand grenades in clusters and use them as mines. Finally, we uncovered an army weapons storage depot with many RPG-7s. These are the most modern antitank weapons. They are of Soviet manufacture. After a few days we forced them to fall back, leaving behind seven tanks. But most important, my people have learned not to fear tanks."

It all seems like a tale out of André Malraux's "La Condition Humaine." The first person I interviewed is a figure that could have participated in the first insurrection of Shanghai, while conspiring with the Kuomintang and the Communist International simultaneously. From time to time, when it serves their purpose, those in Tehran accuse him of being an American agent ("We have proof that he is receiving funds from the United States.") Or Russian, ("He was a member of the World Federation for Democratic Youth and lived in Prague for 15 years") or even a Zionist ("His wife is a Czech Jew--isn't that enough?"). Perhaps Qasemlu is all of the above or could become it, in this part of the world which has always been a hunting ground for secret services of the great powers. Perhaps he, like the rest of the Kurdish population, has never been too subtle, always fleeing to avoid genocide and possibly accepted aid from wherever it came. Perhaps it is also true that behind the last war one might spy the hidden hand of the Baath from Iraq, even though he said that among his compatriots on Iranian soil there is only one tribe which is faithful to Baghdad, that of Sheik Hossman, near Pavah.

However, all of this does not mean much. It doesn't stop Qasemlu, a refined gentleman in his 50's who defines himself as "Eurocommunists," from being sincere when he says that he wants peace with Tehran. For generation upon generation, the Kurds' dream in this area (between Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey,

and the USSR) has been to reconquer a fatherland lost 1,000 years ago. Now their outlook is more realistic: it would suffice for them to administer themselves with an autonomy model based on European examples. Following the fall of the shah, to which the Kurds contributed in a significant manner, Qasemlu believed that he could obtain autonomy from the new regime. That proved to be an illusion. The various "revolutionary" governments have for months negotiated or feigned to negotiate. Then last August they attempted to resolve the problem by launching an unfortunate military expedition. Finally, neither winning nor losing, they returned to the negotiating table.

This time, however, Qasemlu was not the only representative. In addition to him and his Peshmargan, other groups came to the fore which were much more intransigent, protected by the singular religious figure of Sheik Ezzedin Hoseyni. With a long flowing beard, his thin hands perennially fingering his worry beads, this Sunnite priest certainly does possess a singular charismatic attraction. Whoever speaks to him generally praises his docility and is also surprised at the contrast between his aspect and the extremist ferocity of the young men under his leadership, the so-called Komala. Hoseyni told me candidly that "with Tehran there is no possibility of negotiation," that the "Iranian Government is, to put it simply, fascist" and that the only solution left is "armed struggle." Behind his gentle glance one intermittently sees bolts of rage.

If this war, differing from others, claims more victims among the civilian population, it is due in large part to him. Three weeks ago, while Qasemlu was attempting to negotiate with Tehran, having just scored his victory over the 64th Division, the Komala went on the offensive in urban centers, where they have more of a following. Reversing the Maoist theory they claim to follow, they wanted to throw out "the occupier" from the cities. At the beginning they fought only with the "people's feddayn," a highly politicized, far left group that is present throughout Iran and has even sent teams into Kordestan. Later, Qasemlu's Peshmargan also joined the fight, to at least project a guerilla warfare "image." Thus the combatants spread like water rings in a pond. First Saqqez, then Buchan, and finally Sanandaj, Kordestan's most populous city, with 400,000 inhabitants.

Since then, the repression has threatened to turn into a massacre. The army has been ordered to react with extreme harshness because, among others, those cities are the nearest to the Iraqi border. From the positions on the hills that surround the inhabited centers, 90-mm and 105-mm shells fall on the streets. Mortars never stop firing. The 52 helicopters available to the government on this front are used to transport the wounded and medical supplies, but on occasion they have indiscriminately opened fire on civilians. ("Tell the Italians how their Agusta helicopters are used and ask them to halt shipments of spare parts" we were told wherever we went.)

Apparently it seems that the air force's fighters did not bomb cities: this is so because many of the pilots would have rebelled. In Isfahan, three of them were put before a firing squad. They are not the only officers to dissent: "A group of 165 deserting officers came to our headquarters from Sanandaj. We gave them each the equivalent of 20 thousand lire so they could get back home," said Qasemlu.

But the head of the strongest Kurdish party is not happy with the desertions, with the 400 prisoners or with the ephemeral victories his men won when they went to the aid of the Komala to fight in the streets. He said: "I have repeated to Hoseyni that we will not remain in the cities forever. My guerillas will provide cover for his men as long as they can, but then they will go back to the mountains, to their natural surroundings."

It is here, in the quiet and splendor of a mountain that harbors his secret headquarters, that Qasemlu speaks at length about his disappointments. He thought a dialogue with Bani Sadr possible, but he found out that the "lay" president does not intend to recognize his people's autonomy. Even more, he intends to settle the Kurdish matter once and for all. He talks about it with his staff headquarters generals at least three times a week. "Bani Sadr does not know" said Qasemlu "what we know: only 30 percent of the army is faithful to him. The rest is ready to overthrow him at a moment's notice. As we see it, and we have reliable sources of information throughout the whole country, the other 70 percent is broken down in the following manner; 10 percent is leftist, 20 percent adheres to nationalistic positions and the other 40 percent is available for any kind of reactionary adventure." At this point Qasemlu reveals a disquieting bit of information. "Last November" he said, "several generals came to me and briefed me on a detailed plan: the nighttime bombing of Qom, where Khomeyni was at that time and a simultaneous attack on the seats of power in Tehran. I asked the generals what they would offer us in exchange for our neutrality. They said autonomy, written and guaranteed through the good offices of president Sadat of Egypt. Naturally I refused, and I refused again when they returned a few days before the American blitz of Tabas.

While returning from the rebel headquarters going toward Mahabad, the Land Rover stopped several times. Gas was poured into the tank from reserve cans without wasting one drop. "We even cut their gas supply so they won't be able to move around so easily" said Bani Sadr's assistants in Tehran. I think back to their words: "The Democratic Party is to be defeated; the Kurds will enjoy a relative autonomy only after they lay down their arms; Qasemlu still dreams of becoming the president of a real Kurdish republic, like the one that was set up and immediately fell after World War II." In the valley, beyond the mountains we are crossing, lies the Iranian Army, which is asking for weapons, personnel and prestige in order to defeat the enemy Peshmargan. Which one of the two armies that now face one another will deal the fatal blow to Abol Hassan Bani Sadr's power?

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

27 June 80

D.D.

